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1Summary
Article 28 is one of the key Treaty Articles concerning the
integration of national markets. But finding the right way to apply Article 28 is far
from being easy, as history shows.
The ECJ has not been consistent in its case law on Article 28 EC.
The main problem in its approach in the application of Article 28 has been the
wideness of the Dassonville-formula, which by its wording catches smallest
restrictions, and when such a rule is considered to catch indistinctly applicable
measures, as was decided in Cassis de Dijon, the limits of the outer boundaries
of Article 28 almost disappear, because almost every rule which regulates trade in
the Member States can in fact be said to affect intra-Community trade in some
way. This approach by the ECJ therefore led to problems in setting limits to the
outer boundaries of the Article 28, as became obvious in Cinéthéque and later
the Sunday trading cases.
Before its ruling in Cinéthéque the ECJ seemed to make a
distinction between equal burden and dual burden rules when applying Article 28
EC to limit its scope, and although that approach is primarily based on the
question if there has been any discrimination, and not on the effect of the rule as in
Dassonville, this approach at least made the application of Article 28 easier. But
in Cinéthéque the ECJ decided to use a different approach, and applied Article
28 to an equal burden rule, and based this opinion on the presumption that the
application of the system there might create barriers to intra-Community trade. In
Cinéthéque the restriction was a complete ban on sale for a certain time, and
maybe the ECJ felt that for that reason it was difficult to let the rule fall outside the
scope of Article 28. But nevertheless this judgment clearly got the attention of
traders and defence lawyers throughout Europe. This judgment meant that non-
discriminating rules with little and uncertain potential effects on intra-Community
trade could be tried before the ECJ.
As an answer to criticism on this wide approach to apply Article
28 the ECJ gave the ruling in Keck, and there a new rule-based approach to
Article 28 was presented. According to it certain selling arrangements would fall
outside the scope of Article 28, if they fulfilled the conditions laid down in the
judgment. But as has been pointed out by many, and perhaps most clearly by
Advocate General Jacobs, this approach, to make a distinction between
categories of rules, letting one category fall inside the scope of Article 28 but the
other one outside its scope is not just. The presumption in Keck that “selling
arrangements” are “not by nature such as to prevent…access to the market” is
very questionable to say the least. It is right that restrictions on circumstances in
which certain or all goods might be marketed do normally not obviously interfere
with the free movement of goods but nevertheless it is clearly wrong to say that
such a legislation never has effects on trade between Member States. Although its
2effects are probably most often insignificant it can in some circumstances have
some effects.
In my opinion Keck was not a good judgment. It was for example
very unclear regarding the scope of the important phrase “selling arrangements”.
And in later cases the ECJ decided to interpret this phrase in a wide way, for
example to advertising. In my opinion the ECJ should have applied Keck in a
narrow way, making distinction between static and non-static selling
arrangements, by not applying Keck to the ways which include how a
manufacturer chooses to market his specific product. Then it could for example
have avoided the difficulties it later experienced in applying Keck to advertising.
Keck is an exception from the main rule in Article 28, and that should mean that it
should be confined narrowly.
Keck was intended to limit the scope of Article 28 which many
commentators considered too unclear. It was clearly intended to open a way out
of the scope of Article 28 for rules which only had uncertain and indirect effects
on intra-Community trade. It was in other words intended to keep farfetched
claims from falling within the scope of Article 28. But this could have been done
with a different approach.
The main problem in the application of Article 28 has been that the
ECJ has constantly refused to apply a de minimis rule to limit its scope. But on
the other hand the ECJ has, in cases such as Peralta and DIP SpA, stated that
when the effects of a measure are too “uncertain and  indirect” the measure
should fall outside the scope of Article 28. In my opinion the ECJ could use this
approach more frequently. It makes a lot more sense to let a rule fall outside the
scope of Article 28 because of the fact that its effects are uncertain and indirect
than basing the judgment on the fact that the rule falls inside the scope of a certain
category of rules. By reaching the conclusion in Keck the ECJ went in my opinion
too far from the essence of Article 28, Dassonville and Cassis. It is a fact that
the effects of selling arrangements in the field of free movement of goods are
generally uncertain and indirect and therefore they could in most cases fall outside
the scope of Article 28, as the rules in Peralta and DIP SpA. It can even be said
that there are certain similarities between the approaches in Peralta and DIP SpA
on one hand and Keck on the other. In Peralta and DIP SpA the ECJ concluded
that the rules fell outside the scope of Article 28 because their effect were “too
uncertain and indirect”, and the presumption in Keck that national rules which
restrict certain selling arrangements do not hinder trade within the meaning of the
Dassonville-formula is in fact based on a similar approach. The difference is that
according to Keck, rules falling within a certain category of rules are presumed to
have such indirect and uncertain effects.
It has not yet been made clear by the ECJ if Keck should be
applied to other fields than free movement of goods. In my opinion it should not.
Although Keck was not the right approach to limit the outer boundaries of Article
328, it is true that the selling arrangements which were precluded from the
application of Article 28 do not affect intra-Community trade in most
circumstances. So the distinction made in Keck between rules regarding selling
arrangements and other rules does make some sense in the field of goods. But the
nature of the other fields is on the other hand different so even if a similar
distinction can be made between rules in this field it would be wrong to let a
category of rules fall outside the relevant Treaty Articles without further
justifications. In the other fields this distinction can therefore not be made between
categories of rules.
Regarding how the ECJ has limited the scope of Articles 39 and 49
EC it is interesting to take a look at on what grounds the ECJ reached its
conclusion in Graf. There it completely ignored Keck and stated that the effects
of rules in question were too uncertain and indirect for the rules to be caught by
Article 39. And I believe that the ECJ could use this kind of approach on more
occasions, not only in those two fields, but also within the free movement of
goods.
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61 Introduction
…contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to
products from other Member States of national provisions
restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not as to
hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially trade between
Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville
judgment…provided that those provisions apply to all affected
traders operating within the national territory and provided that
they affect in the same manner, in law and fact, the marketing of
domestic products and those from other Member States.
Paragraph 16 of Keck and Mithouard.1
Deciding the outer boundaries of Article 28 EC has proven to be a
difficult task for the ECJ. In Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon the ECJ provided
a very wide approach to the Article, and that led to problems in later cases and
criticism by commentators. In the famous Keck judgment the ECJ, as an answer
to the criticism, went back on its earlier rulings and introduced a new approach.
According to it restrictions on certain selling arrangements were to fall outside the
scope of Article 28 altogether if they fulfilled the conditions laid down in the
judgment.
But Keck has also been criticised, and has been considered by
many as a bad clarification if not altogether wrong, and commentators are in fact
still recommending different approaches on how to decide the outer boundaries of
Article 28 EC. Most commentators  agree on that there have to be certain limits
on its outer scope, because of how wide the Dassonville- formula is, but there is
far from being an agreement on the grounds which the limits should be decided
upon.
The aim of this thesis is to try to find out if the approach which the
ECJ chose in Keck to limit the scope of Article 28 was the right one, or if some
other approach had better served the purpose of the judgment. I will discuss how
the ECJ chose to develop the approach introduced in Keck, and analyse the
cases which have provided a clarification of how Keck should be applied. I will
also discuss if the approach taken in Keck should be applied to other fields than
free movement of goods and analyse cases where that has been taken into
consideration.
To do this I will begin by giving a short overview on rules regarding
the free movement of goods and the problem at hand in deciding the outer
boundaries of Article 28. Then I will go through the development of case law of
the ECJ regarding Article 28 from Dassonville until Keck was decided. Then
there will be a chapter about the judgment in Keck itself, which will be followed
                                                
1 Joined cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1991]
ECR I-6097.
7by a chapter on the case law after Keck was decided, where the ECJ developed
this new approach. Then I will discuss four different approaches for deciding the
outer limits of Article 28, that is, the solution before Keck, the solution in Keck
itself, the solution to look primarily at if a measure causes a hindrance to market
access and finally the question if a de minimis rule should be introduced in cases
regarding Article 28. I will then discuss if Keck should be applied to other fields
than the free movement of goods, and finally there will be a conclusion.
This paper is based on a literature study, legislative material and on
the case law of the European Court of Justice.
82 A short overview on rules
regarding the Free movement of
goods
In Article 14(2)EC it is stated that;
the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured in accordance with the provosions of this Treaty.
These four fundamental freedoms of movement2 are of course all
very important, but the free movement of goods has been considered to be the
most important one, and in fact the corner stone of the Community, because the
access to a Community-wide market has been a primary reason for membership
by many Member States.
In Title one of part three of the EC Treaty the rules regarding the
free movement of goods are laid down. They are supposed to ensure the removal
of duties, quotas and quantative restrictions on the movement of goods within the
Community. The purpose of these rules is to ensure that  competition between
goods coming from different Member States is not prevented or distorted by
governent provisions which limit the amount of such goods which can be imported
(quotas) or increase their price(tariffs).
The free movement of goods can be distorted in many ways, and
those possible distortions are dealt with in different Articles of the Treaty. The
most obvious form of protection by a Member State is when it attempts to erect
custom duties or charges having equivalent effect, trying to make foreign goods
more expensive then domestic ones. This is dealt with in Articles 23 – 25 EC
which are of central importance to the establisment of a custom Union.3 Other
provisions which relate closely to the rules regarding custom duties are the
provisions on discriminatory taxes. The central provision in that area is Article
90.4 Its purpose is to prevent the obectives of Articles 23 – 25 being achieved by
discriminatory taxation. Articles 23 – 25 would in fact be of a little help if
                                                
2 According to some commentators, for example Kapteyn and Themaat (page 576), the
freedoms are five, with freedom of payment as the fifth freedom.
3 In Article 23(1) the basic rule is stated:”The Community shall be based upon a customs
union which shall cover all trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between
Member States of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having
equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common custom tariff in their relation with third
countries.”
4 In Article 90 it is stated that: ” No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the
products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed
directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. Furthermore, no Member State shall
impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to
afford indirect protection to other products.
9Member States could prejudice foreign goods when inside its territory by
discriminatory taxation.
Although the rules on duties, charges and taxes, which are laid
down in the Treaty are very important, they would not have been sufficient to
guarantee free movement of goods within the common market.5 Each Member
State then could have created other barriers to trade of a non-pecuniary nature,
which are also capable of hindering free flow of goods between Member States.
That is why Articles 28 EC has proven to be so important in the development of
the internal market. That is not least because of the ECJ´s jurisprudence under the
Articles which has made a huge contribution to free movement of goods within the
Community.
Under Article 30 EC certain prohibitions or restrictions on imports,
exports or goods in transit are allowed. They have to be justified on grounds of
reasons stated in the Article.6
                                                
5 For an overview of those rules see for example Craig and de Búrca, p. 548 – 579 and Steiner
and Woods, p. 139 –150.
6 These reasons are: public moralty, public policy or public security, the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or palnts, the protection of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaelogical value or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. According tto Article 30 this prohibitions or restrictions shall on the other hand
not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States.
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3 The search for the right test
for Article 28 EC
Article 28 EC provides that;
quantative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent
effect shall be prohibited between Member States.
Article 28 is one of the key Treaty Articles concerning the
integration of national markets. Through integration the Community is in fact trying
to limit the influence of national governments on production and consumption
activities in the Community. This stems from both economic and political
concerns.
But finding the right way to apply Article 28 is far from being easy,
as history shows. It has been pointed out that the borderline between legitimate
and illegitimate national regulations under Article 28 should reflect the balance
between the desire for integration on one hand, and the desire for government
intervention on the other. Therefore national measures should be struck down
under Article 28 which are more harmful than beneficial, that is, their obstructive
effect on integration of national markets would overweight their valued regulatory
contribution. The test is therefore always essentially a balancing test and depends
on whether anti-integrationist effect of the national measures is considered to
outweight its valued regulatory effect or not.7
Different tests has been used by the ECJ over time, and other types
of tests have been suggested by commentators. And it is in fact far from being
easy to find find out how the test should be, as will become obvious later in this
paper.
It has been pointed out that when one compares different possible
tests, two elements should be considered, that is error costs and administrative
costs.8 An unclear test on the limits of the scope on Article 28 can lead to errors,
for example by wrong judgments or that national measures which would be struck
down under a full test on Article 28 are not challenged because of how unclear
the rules are. Error costs are the costs which can be attached to those errors.
Administrative costs on the other hand include the operational costs of the courts
and also the costs of the parties concerned, and the fact is that a full test can be
extremely expansive.
The best test is of course a test which minimises both the sum of
error costs and administrative cost. The trick is therefore to find a test which is as
full as possible, and therefore minimises error costs, without being to expansive
for the courts and the parties.
                                                
7 Wils, page 478-9.
8 Wils, page 480.
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As has been mentioned the ECJ has not been consistent in the
difficult task of deciding on the outer boundaries of Article 28. The wording of the
Aricle is very open so the way the ECJ chose to interpretet it was very important,
not least for the integration process in the Community. And the ECJ went in fact
very far in letting national restictions to trade fall inside the scope of Article 28.
In the next chapter an overview will be given on how the ECJ used
different approaches in its cases on Article 28 before it gave its decision in Keck.
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4 The development of case-law
on Article 28 EC.
The ECJ has been far from being consistent in its case law on
Article 28 EC. In Dassonville and Cassis it provided a very wide formula in its
judgments of what should be regarded as measures having effects equal to
quantative restrictions under Article 28. That on the other hand led to problems in
setting limits to the outer boundaries of the Article, which later led to the ECJ´s
decision in Keck and Mithouard, which was intended to limit the scope of the
Article.
4.1 The basic rules.
According to Article 28 EC ”quantative restrictions on imports and
all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member
States”.
The first question which arises when one reads Article 28 is what
can be considered to be ”quantative restictions”. That came into consideration in
the Geddo case in 1973, and was defined very broadly there.9
When it had been defined what ”quantative restrictions” were,
according to Article 28, the next question which arose was of course what could
be regarded to be ”measures having equivalent effect” to quantative restrictions.
The Commission provided guidance to the Member States to the meaning and
scope of the term by passing Directive 70/50, and in Article 2(3) of the Directive
the Commission provided a non-exhaustive list of measures capable of having
effect equivalent to quantative restrictions. The Directive is not applicable
anymore but still it continues to give a general idea of the scope of the term
“measures having equivalent effect” in Article 28.10
                                                
9 Case 2/73, Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865. It was stated there that it meant
”measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances,
imports, exports or goods in transit”
10 The measure there include: minimum or maximum prices specified for imported products,
less favourable prices for importes products, lowering the value of the imported product by
reducing its intrinsic value or increasing its cost, payment conditions for imported
productswchich differ from those for domestic products, conditions in respect of packaging,
composition, identification, size, wight, etc. which only apply to imported goods or which
are different and more difficult to satisfy than in the case of domestic goods, the giving of
preference to the purchase of domestic goods as opposed to imports or otherwise hindering
the purchase of imports, limiting publicity in respect of imported goods as compared with
domestic products, prescribing stocking requirement which are different from and more
difficult to satisfy than those which apply to domestic goods, and making it mandatory for
importers of goods to have an agent in the territory of the imoprting State.
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But it was in the famous Dassonville-case that the ECJ finally laid
down its wide interpretation of what constituted “measures having equivalent
effect” to quantative restriction under Article 28.11
4.1.1 Dassonville
In Dasonville the ECJ provided its famous Dassonville-formula.
According to it ”[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade
are to be considered as measures having effect equivalent to quantative
restrictions.”12
The Dassonville-case regarded Belgian law that provided that
goods bearing a destination of origin could only be imported to Belgium if
accompanied by certificate from the exporting country where it was confirmed
that it allowed such a designation. When Dassonville imported Scotch whisky into
Belgium from France without such a certificate he was prosecuted. He argued
that the Belgian law should fall under the prohibition in Article 28 EC.
After providing its so called Dassonville-formula the ECJ stated
that measures taken by Member States to prevent unfair practices should be
reasonable and the means of proof required should not act as a hindrance to trade
between Member States. It concluded that the requirement of a certificate in this
case constituted a measure having equivalent effect to a quantative restriction
under Article 28 EC.
According to the Dassonville-formula, the important element in
proving the existance of measures equivalent to quantative restrictions is the effect
of the restriction. It does not require discriminatory intent. The Dassonville-
formula is also very broad. The rules only have to be capable of hindering trade
indirectly and potentially to fall under the formula. As should have been expected
this wideness of the formula created problems in later cases.13
 One problem after this judgment was the question if the
Dassonville-formula could only be applied to discriminatory rules, as the rules in
the case itself, or if it would also apply to rules which were non-discriminatory,
but had discriminatory effect indirectly. There are in fact many rules which do not
seem to discriminate between goods dependent upon origin, but nevertheless
create a real barrier to the entry of products into Member States. The possability
to apply Article 28 to such indistintly applicable rules was opened in Dassonville,
and this question was finally answered in the famous Cassis de Dijon, where the
ECJ laid also down the ”rule of reason” on how such rules, although inside the
scope of Article 28, could be justified and excepted from the Article without using
the exceptions in Article 30 EC.
                                                
11 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
12 Para. 5 of the judgment.
13 See chapter 4.2.
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4.1.2 Cassis de Dijon
Cassis de Dijon14 is an extremely important case in the history of
the ECJ, and has even by some be considered to be the most important one.
There the ECJ came to the conclusion that Article 28 not only caught measures
which were directly discriminating, but also indistinctly applicable rules, which
applied both to national and foreign goods.
The case conserned West German rules which governed the
marketing of alcohol beverages. According to the rules the minimum alcohol
strenght of various categories of alcohol products was fixed at 25% of alcohol per
litre. The applicant in the case had intended to import the liqeur ”Cassis de Dijon”
into Germany from France, but was refused by the German authorities on grounds
of those rules, because the liqueur only had alcohol content between 15 and 20
per cent. The applicant argued that the rules constituted measures having
equivalent effect to quantative restrictions, but the German government cited
human health and consumer protection in defence of its legislation.
The rule in this case was not directly discriminating, since it applied
to both national and foreign goods. Therefore the question was if the
Dassonville-formula would apply to those restrictions, which were indistinctly
applicable.
The ECJ came to the conclusion that it did. It stated that although
obstacles to movement within the Community had to be accepted in certain
exceptional circumstances the main rule was that they could not be accepted.15
The only exceptions from the main rule would be if the rules were necessary in
order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to certain aspects
which the ECJ laid down in the judgment.16 The list provided there was not
exhaustive.17
As was said here above this case was extremely important for the
European Community. According to it, it was not really necessary in all
circumstances to harmonize rules with legislative measures. According to the ECJ,
rules which affected importation of foreign goods or made it difficult could be
caught by Article 28 EC and were therefore illegal, if not justified on grounds of
mandatory requirements. Those mandatory requirement, which in fact constitute
                                                
14 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979]
ECR 649, [1979].
15 Para 8 of the judgment. The ECJ actually states this rule ”backwards”. It stated that
”Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so
far as those provisions may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection
of public health, the fariness of commercial transaction and the defence of the consumer.”
16 In Cassis the rule of reason was not in terms confined to indistinctly applicable measures.
But shortly after Cassis in Gilli (case 788/79) the court stated that this principle should only
apply where national rules apply without discrimination.
17 The ECJ has later provided for many more mandatory requirements in its judgments such
as the enviroment, pluralism of the press and fostering certain form of art.
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the rule of reason, are considered within the application of Article 28, seperatly
from any analises based on the exceptions in Article 30.18
Another impotant part of the judgment is paragraph 14(4) where
the ECJ stated that once good have been lawfully marketed in one Member
State, they should be admitted into any other Member State without restrictions,
unless the State of import could successfully envoke one of the mandatory
requirements. This has been called the principle of mutual recognision. Member
States must respect the trading rules of other Member States and may not seek to
impose their own rules on goods which have already been markeded in another
Member State.
The ECJ´s decision in Cassis to widen the scope of Article 28
should not have come as a big surprise. The wording of Article 28 is extremely
open, and the door to the conclusion reached in Cassis was in fact opened in
Dassonville. But on the other hand one should have expected that this approach
could create problems regarding the outer boundaries of Article 28. By extending
the scope of the Article to all indistinctly applicable measures which affected intra-
Community trade one should have expected that there could be a problem to
decide the limits of the Article, because the fact is that it can be said that all rules
which concern trade, directly or indirectly, can affect the free movement of goods.
So this approach of course opened up the opportunity for traders, which were
unhappy with legislation which somehow regulated trade, to try to get the
legislation declared void because it violated Article 28.
And that was exactly what happened. Traders began to try to use
Article 28 in various circumstances and the ECJ began experiencing difficulties in
where to set the outer boundaries of the Article.
4.2 The basic rules become unclear.
4.2.1 Cinéthéque.
The Cassis doctrine was applied in many cases, and in the
beginning it did not seem to create any problems.19 But later some questions
began to arise regarding the outer limits of where Article 28 could be applied. The
ECJ began to show a tendency to apply the Dassonville- formula “mechanically”
and to require measures which could affect the volume of import, but with no
potential to really hinder import to be justified under the rule of reason. As was
mentioned above the fact is of course that all rules which regulate trade can be
                                                
18 See further discussion in chapter 7.1.
19 Examples of the many cases where the Cassis doctrine was applied are Case 407/85, Drei
Glocken v. USL Centro-Sud [1988] ECR 4233 and case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v.
Confédaration du Commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl [1990] ECR I-667.
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said to affect the free movement of goods. Therefore the important question was
where and how the limits of the outer boundaries of Article 28 should be set.
One way of making a difference was to make a distinction between
dual-burden and equal-burden rules.20 Dual burden rules are rules which apply to
imported goods which have already fulfilled similar rules in the home State. An
example of such rules are the rules which the ECJ took into consideration in
Cassis de Dijon. Equal burden rules on the other hand apply to all goods, are not
designed to be protectionist, and do not have greater impact on the sale of foreign
goods, even though they can effect the overall volume of trade. It is therefore a
test primarily based on the question if there has been any discrimination.21
So the question was if equal burden rules should be considered to
fall outside the scope of Article 28. And that approach seemed in fact to be
applied in many cases by the ECJ, for example in Oebel and Blesgen. 22
Oebel23 regarded a rule which prohibited the delivery of bakery
products to consumers and retailers at night. This is a clear equal burden rule,
since it affects both national and foreign goods in the same manner. In this case
the ECJ came to the conclusion that this rule was not caught by Article 28 EC.
In Blesgen24 the ECJ took under consideration national rules which
restricted the sale of drinks above certain strenght in all places open to the public
for consumption. This was also a clear equal burden rule. The ECJ came to a
similar conclusion as in Oebel. The ECJ concentraded on that the restrictions in
question made no distinction between the  nature or origin of the spirits. The
legislation had therefore, according to the ECJ, no connection with the
importation of the products and was therefore not of such nature as to hinder
trade between Member States. The ECJ concluded therefore that the legislation
in question would not fall under the prohibition in question.
At this point the ruled seemed to be clear. Article 28 was not to be
understood as to cover equal burden rules, only dual burden rules, because equal
burden rules did not have effects on the importation of goods.
But the problem was that the ECJ was not consistent in deciding
that equal burden rules were not caught by Article 28 EC, and in Cinéthéque25
the ECJ reached a different conclusion.
The case regarded French rules, which applied equally to domestic
and imported videos, which banned the sale and hiring of videos of films during
                                                
20 Craig and de Búrca, page 611, citing Weatherill and Beaumont.
21 The test which the ECJ introduced later in Keck is also based primarily on the question if
there has been any discrimination. But it should be pointed out that according to the
Dassonville-formula the main concern are the effects of the rule in question but not if it is a
discriminatory hindrance to trade.
22 Other cases where the ECJ reached a similar conclusion are for example Case 148/85
Direction Génerale des Impots and Procureur de la République v. Forest [1986] ECR 3449
and Case C-23/89 Quietlynn Ltd. v. Southend-on Sea BC [1990] ECR I-3059.
23 Case 155/80, [1981] ECR 1983.
24 Case 75/81, Belgian State v. Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211.
25 Cases 60 and 61/84, Cinéthéque SA v. Fédération Nationale des Cinémas Francais [1985]
ECR 2605.
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the first year after the film was released. These rules were clearly equal-burden
rules, but nevertheless the ECJ concluded that they were caught by Article 28.
The ECJ came on the other hand to the conclusion that these rules were
nevertheless legal since they were justified by a mandatory requirement under
Article 28.
The Advocate General had reached a different conclusion, based
on the fact that those rules were in fact equal-burden rules, and therefore the rules
should not be considered to be caught by Article 28 at all. His opinion was
therefore in line with Oebel and Blesgen.
When this case is considered it has to be born in mind that
according to the rules in question there was a complete ban on sales over a
considerable period of time of goods which were in free circulation in some parts
of the Common market. Because of that it was probably difficult for the ECJ to
conclude that these rules would not fall prima facie inside the prohibition in
Article 28, although they affected both foreign and national goods in the same
manner. But even if it can be said that the judgment made sense when this was
considered, it had the effect of opening up the limits of Article 28 regarding equal-
burden rules and make its application unclear, and that created problems which
later became obvious in the Sunday Trading cases.
Even though the distinction between equal and dual burden rules is
in fact a test based on discrimination, and is therefore not the right approach when
the Dassonville-formula is considered, this is in my opinion the case where the
ECJ really went wrong, and in fact created itself the confusion about the outer
limits of Article 28. With this approach the ECJ opened up the limits of Article 28
by applying it to rules which had equal effects on imported and domestic goods.
This ruling therefore had the effect of making it easier for traders to try rather
farfetched cases before the ECJ, because after it the limits of Article 28 were very
open.
This was therefore in my opinion not a good judgment by the ECJ.
With it the ECJ opened up all gates to Article 28, and its effects should have been
forseen. The difficulties in applying Dassonville and Cassis to small, unclear and
indirect potential restrictions without any test based on discrimination should have
been obvious. The difficulties in the cases which followed made it clear that to
limit the scope of Article 28, either a some kind of a de minimis rule, or a test
based on discrimination on import, was needed.26
4.2.2 The Sunday trading-cases.
As was mentioned above the ECJ started to experience difficulties
in deciding on the outer boundaries of Article 28 after its decision in Cinéthéque.
                                                
26 The possability of introducing a some kind of a de minimis rule in the aplication of Article
28 will be discussed in chapters 7.4. and 9.
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And it was in the Sunday trading cases that it became very clear how problematic
it could be to use the approach in Cinéthéque in some cases.
In the late 80´s several cases came before the ECJ regarding
British rules which prohibited shops to sell on Sundays. The rules applied of
course equally to foreign and domestic goods. The ECJ was therefore granted a
good opportunity to make it clear that the judgment in Cinéthéque had been as it
was because of the exceptional circumstances there, and to return to the
approach which it had applied regarding equal-burden rules in Oebel and Blesgen
for example, and say that the effects of these restrictions simply were too
uncertain and indirect to fall under Article 28. But the ECJ did not do so. On the
contrary it used the same approach as in Cinéthéque and ruled that those
restrictions were prima facie inside Article 28, although it ruled that they could
be justified under yet another mandatory requirement.27
An example of the Sunday trading cases is Torfaen.28 It regarded
a shop which was prosecuted for violating the Sunday trading law. The owner of
the shop claimed that the law constituted a measure equivalent to quantative
restriction. The law reduced total turnover by about 10%, which was the same
regarding national and foreign goods, so the fact was that foreign goods were not
in any worse position than national goods. The ECJ cited its judgment in
Cinéthéque and reached a similar conclusion as there. But more interestingly it
also cited Oebel, and said that, as had been decided there, national rules
governing the hours of work, delivery and sale in the bread and confectionery
industry constituted a legitimate part of economic and social policy, which were
consistent with the objectives of public interest pursued by the Treaty. It then
continued to say that the same had to apply in this case, although the ECJ said on
the other hand the rules fell prima facie under Article 28.29
The reason for that the ECJ made a distinction between Oebel and
Torfaen was clearly that it thought that the rules in the latter one in fact had some
effects on intra-Community trade which were clear enough for the rules in
question to be caught by the Dassonville-formula. So this made it clear that the
ECJ did not intend to make any distinction based on the type of the rules in
question, and if they created any discrimination, but to look primarily at the effects
of the rules on intra-Community trade. In other words, it did not intend to let an
equal burden rule fall outside the scope of Article 28 simply because it was that
kind of a rule. So instead of going back to draw the line between dual-burden and
equal-burden rules, and presume that the effects of equal burden rules were too
unclear and indirect to fall under the Dassonville-formula, as it seemed to have
done in Oebel and several other cases, the ECJ decided to follow the line in
Cinéthéque.
                                                
27 The mandatory requirement which the ECJ recognized there was to ensure that working
hours were arranged to accord with ”national or regional socio-cultural character-istics”.
28 Case 145/88, Torfaen BC v. B & Q plc, [1989] ECR 3851.
29 Para 13 and 14 of the judgment.
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One big problem which followed this approach was that it was left
to the national courts to decide if the rules were proportionate or not, that is if
they were not excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved. The
problem was that the national courts reached different conclusions on this issue.
While some found the Sunday trading law compatible with Article 28, others did
not. That caused of course a huge legal uncertainty in this field.
At this point it was argued by many that there was no balance in
the Court´s test on Article 28, and the Article had in fact almost no limits under
this approach. All restrictions were considered to fall under the Article prima
facie and the parties had to find some good reason, in the form of mandatory
requirements, to get them outside the scope of the Article. There was no simple
rule which allowed national measures to fall outside Article 28 without going
through the rather heavy process of Dassonville and Cassis.
One of the commentators which gave his opinion on how to decide
on the outer boundaries of Article 28 was E. White.30 His idea of solution was to
make a distinction between rules regarding the charasteristics of the goods on one
hand and rules regarding the circumstances which goods might be sold on the
other.
And later it became clear that the ECJ had its doubts about this
approach. That came clear with the judgment in Keck and Mithouard 31, where
the ECJ introduced yet another approach to this problem. That approach was in
line with the one that E. White had recommended.
                                                
30 In his article In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty (1989) 26 CMLRev,
235.
31 Cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1991] ECR
I-6097.
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5 Keck and Mithouard
The case of Keck and Mithouard regarded two men by the names
Keck and Mithouard, managers of supermarkets at Mundolsheim and
Geispolsheim, which were prosecuted in France for selling 1.264 bottles of
“Picon” beer and 544 kilograms of “Sati Rouge” coffee at prices below those
which they had purchased them. Resale at loss was prohibited under French law,
but the law in question did on the other hand not ban sale at loss by
manufacturers. Keck and Mithouard argued that the law was contrary to
Community law concerning free movement of goods, persons services and capital
and the principles of free competition within the Community.
The case was referred to the ECJ in June 1991 by the Tribunal de
Grande Instance, Strasbourg. The national court referred two questions to the
ECJ:
Is the prohibition in France of resale at loss under Article 32 of Order 86-1243 of
1 December 1986 compatible with the principles of the free movement of goods,
services and capital, free competition in the Common Market and non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in the Treaty of 25 March
1957 establishing the EEC, and more particularly in Articles 3 and 7 thereof,
since the French legislation is liable to distort competition: (a) firstly, because it
makes only resale at loss an offence and exempts from the scope of the
prohibition the manufacturer, who is free to sell on the market the product
which he manufactures, processes or improves, even very slightly, at a price
lower than his cost price; (b) secondly, in that it distorts competition, especially
in frontier zones between the various traders on the basis of their nationality
and place of establishment?
As can be seen the questions were not exactly clear and precise
but the ECJ took them under consideration anyhow.
It was clear that even if the purpose of the prohibition was to
ensure fairness of commercial transaction it was evident that it could impede
imports in two particular ways, firstly by prohibiting resale at loss which is one of
the techniques used when launching new products onto the market and secondly
because an importer might be in competition with French manufacturers who can
sell directly on the market.32
The Advocate General in this case, Mr Van Gerven, had given an
opinion in the first Sunday trading case. There he had proposed that the ECJ
should adopt a more reserved approach towards national rules which were not
intended to regulate intra-Community trade, by declaring Article 28 only
applicable to rules of this type if they had the effect of screening or partitioning the
market. The ECJ did not follow his opinion in that case, so he assumed that in this
case the Court would adhere to the broad Dassonville-formula. Then he stated
that he thought that the ECJ owed a duty to the national courts to make this quite
                                                
32 Moore, page 196.
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clear to avoid confusion. He took under consideration the latest Sunday Trading
case, Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v. B & Q,, where the ECJ had
stated that when it was being decided if a measure should fall prima facie within
the scope of Article 28, and had a proportionate effect on intra-Community trade,
it had to be assessed according to whether that effect was direct, indirect or
purely speculative, suggesting that even a measure which had only a speculative
effect on trade might fall within the prohibition. Mr. Van Gerven made the
conclusion that the ECJ had thereby chosen not to restrict the scope of Article
28, but instead it would regulate its application by using the doctrine of mandatory
requirements and proportionality.
He applied this approach to the legislation in Keck but discovered
a complication. Where the prohibition on resale extended to circumstances which
did not invoke a need for consumer protection it could not been said that that it
pursued an object justified with respect to Community law. There the concept of
proportionality did therefore not become relevant. He concluded therefore that
the rules were caught by Article 28 whatever the assessments of proportionality
were. But nevertheless Mr. Van Gerven concluded that in this case the measure
would not fall inside the scope of Article 28. In his conclusion he said that in the
context of the reference for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ should give the national
court all the information which it needs in order to decide the case before it, but
that information only. It would therefore be sufficient to tell the national court that
a statutory prohibition of resale at a loss was not incompatible with Article 28
since the events at issue occurred at the retail level, a level in respect of which a
recognized ground of justification might be invoked for the rules in question and
that at that level there was no more than a purely hypothetical effect on trade
between Member States and certainly no more than an hypothetical hindering of
trade flows.
The ECJ decided not to follow the Advocate General opinion in
this case and introduced instead a whole new approach.
The ECJ began by citing the Dassonville-formula. Then it stated
that the purpose of this legislation was not to regulate trade in goods between
Member States. The ECJ said that although such a legislation might restrict the
volume of sales, and hence the sale of products from other Member States, it was
still a question if such a possibility was sufficient to characterize this legislation as a
measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports.
Then the ECJ made a rather strange comment on why it felt
necessary to change its approach to such cases. It said that because of increasing
tendency of traders to invoke Article 28 EC to challenge rules whose effect was
to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules were not aimed at
products from other Member states it found it necessary to re-examine and clarify
its case law on this matter.33
                                                
33 With this comment it seemed like the ECJ was blaming over-ambitious traders for creating
the problems in applying Article 28. The fact was of course that the ECJ had itself created
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The ECJ then cited Cassis de Dijon and added that the
prohibitions which should be considered to be caught by the principle laid down
there were requirements such as form, size, weight, composition, presentation,
labelling and packaging. Then the ECJ stated the essence of the judgment:
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to
products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or
prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the
meaning of the Dassonville judgment (Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837), so long as
those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national
territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the
sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid
down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the
market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic
products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty.
Accordingly, the reply to be given to the national court is that Article 30 of the
EEC Treaty is to be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a Member State
imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss.
With its judgment in Keck the ECJ was clearly trying to create
clearer limits to Article 28 to make its application easier. But the method used to
make this distinction was questionable and has provided a huge amount of
academic literature.
The method the ECJ provided in this judgment was to make a
distinction between rules which relate to the goods themselves in the terms of
composition, packaging, presentation which would still fall within the scope of
Article 28, and rules relating to selling arrangements which were thought to be
outside the scope of Article 28, even though they might affect the total volume of
goods sold, if the conditions provided for in the judgment were met.
It was true that before this judgment was given there was clearly a
problem how and if Article 28 EC applied to some circumstances, but the
solution which was provided in it was in fact not altogether clear either. Its
purpose was probably to empower national courts to dismiss farfetched attempts
by traders to use Article 28 in cases which were clogging up the Community legal
system with affairs which should be purely local. But the risk was on the other
hand that the approach was to formal which could lead to strange rulings in some
circumstances. The fact was that even if it could be said that the ECJ had clarified
the scope of Article 28 EC to some extent it also raised questions on its own.
Another problem was that the ECJ did not identify the case law which was not
applicable after this judgment.
                                                                                                                           
the problem with inconsistency in its judgments, and by opening up the limits of Article 28
without any safety-net to exclude farfetched claims.
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A special problem was that the notion of “selling arrangements”
was not clear as became apparent in later cases.34 It has also been pointed out
that when the ECJ decided to treat rules affecting “selling arrangements” as a
special category it wrongly induced focus on the form of a measure instead of its
effect, contrary the essence of Dassonville.35 Perhaps the ECJ did that because it
was a shorthand way of expressing the idea that some kinds of market
interventions do not hinder market access. But it could have done that without
drawing the line between categories of rules. The assumption that the rules in
question, and other selling arrangements which would fall outside the scope of
Article 28 under this new rule, were not by nature such as to prevent their access
to the market or to impede access any more than they impeded the access of
domestic products was also unclear if not altogether wrong.36
This ruling was in part based on the distinction between dual burden
rules and equal burden rules. It can in fact be said that rules concerning selling
arrangements only impose an equal burden on those seeking to market goods and
they are said not to impose extra cost on the importer.37 But why did the ECJ not
draw the line just there instead of basing this approach on what category of rules
were questioned? Probably the ECJ believed that this approach made the point
clearer and served better its intentions to keep traders from bringing farfetched
cases before the Court. The ECJ might also have thought that even though the
“certain selling arrangements” referred to in Keck fell outside the scope of Article
28, some other equal burden rules could have enough effects on intra-Community
trade to be considered under Article 28.
After the ECJ had provided Keck, questions arose on what the
limits of Keck itself were. The fact was that in the beginning it was difficult to
estimate the real effect of the judgment in Keck. It was for example not clear what
earlier cases Keck overruled, although it was obvious that it at least overruled the
Sunday trading cases, and the unclearness of the notion “selling arrangement” was
also a problem.38
But what is clear is that in Keck the ECJ did in fact shift the burden
of proof. If a restriction would fall under “selling arrangements” under the
judgment it would be assumed that it was not a hindrance caught by Article 28.
And in Keck itself it led to that the legislation in question was considered to fall
outside the scope of Article 28 EC.
In my opinion Keck was not a good judgment by the ECJ. It had in
the latest Sunday trading cases given its opinion on how such cases should be
                                                
34 It was difficult to see how far the ECJ would strech the scope of this concept. It later
became clear that the ECJ understood this concept in a wide way, streching its scope to
marketing rules such as rules about advertising. See chapters 6.5. – 6.8.
35 Wheatherill, page 896.
36 This assumtion will be taken under consideration in chapter 7.3.
37 Craig and de Búrca, page 618.
38 See chapter 6 where post-Keck cases are discussed.
24
decided, and the difficulties which came apparent in those cases could have
passed without further actions by the ECJ. It also seems strange to make a
distinction between categories of rules, and to presume that one category should
fall outside the scope of Article 28 while the other should fall inside its scope
without looking primarily at the effect of the rules in question. This went in fact
against the Dassonville-formula where the emphasis is on the effects of the
measures in question but not on the question if  a measure is discriminating or not.
Another thing is that the ECJ left many questions about the scope of Keck itself
unanswered, such as about the notion of “selling arrangements” and that was
bound to create problems in applying this new approach.
As was said here above the approach which was used Keck and
Mithouard was unclear and it was clearly very important how the ECJ would
decide to apply this new approach. In later cases the ECJ developed and clarified
its scope, and to understand better the test which the ECJ provided in Keck, and
to see its effects, it is therefore necessary to look at how this test has been applied
by the ECJ in later cases.
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6 Post-Keck cases
After the ECJ provided the Keck judgment, the test in it has been
used and clarified in many cases.
6.1 Commission v. Greece.
In the case Commission v. Greece39, which was one of the first
decided after Keck, the effect of Keck was obvious. The case regarded Greek
legislation which reserved the sale of processed milk for infants in principle
exclusively to pharmacies. The Commission took the view that those rules
constituted a measure having equivalent effect to a quantative restriction on
imports, and exceeded what was necessary to achieve the aims of protecting the
health of infants and promoting breast feeding.
The Greek Government did not agree and claimed that exclusive
sale of pharmacies of milk for infants did not affect importation of that product
from other Member States and did therefore not constitute a measure having
effect within the meaning of Article 28. It also claimed that the legislation could be
justified under Article 30, since it was necessary and appropriate in order to
protect the health and life of infants during the critical first five months of life.
The case was brought to the ECJ where the Commission stated
that the legislation in question was caught by Article 28 since the prohibition was
likely to hinder, albeit indirectly, intra-Community trade in the product concerned.
According to the Commission the legislation did not constitute a mere restriction
of certain selling arrangements within the meaning of Keck but also entailed a
restrictive effect on trade by making the importation of the product more difficult.
If the product could be sold in large stores their price would drop, which would
lead to increased demand, which would then lead to more importation of the
product.
The Greek Government did of course not agree. It pointed out that
this measure had not led to a fall in the consumption of infant milk nor an
increased price of the product.
The ECJ began by citing Dassonville. Then it stated that the
legislation in question was not designed to regulate trade between Member
States. The Court then cited Keck and stated that the legislation which had been
called into question in the case fulfilled the conditions in Keck, and therefore fell
outside the scope of Article 28.
The fact that processed milk for infants was not produced in
Greece was invoked by the Commission. But that did not matter according to the
ECJ. It stated that the application of Article 28 could not depend on such a purely
fortuitous factual circumstances which might easily change over time. According
                                                
39 Case C-391/92, Commission v. Greece [1995] ECR I-1621.
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to the ECJ that could have the strange consequence that the same legislation
would fall under Article 28 in certain Member States but fall outside it in others.
This could only be different if it was clear that the legislation in question in fact
protected domestic products which were similar to processed milk from other
Member States.
So the legislation at issue was considered to fall under Keck and
thereby fell outside the prohibition in Article 28.
The opposite to this approach was to be found in Advocate
General Lenz opinion. According to him Article 28 went beyond a mere
prohibition of discrimination and he believed that its aim continued to be to
prohibit such measures in order to establish and maintain an internal market.
According to him the determinative factor should therefore be if there was a
hindrance to the market of imported goods. He was therefore in favour of a test
based on market access.40
As was mentioned here above this case demonstrated clearly the
effects of the judgment in Keck. The first concern of the ECJ was to find out if the
rules in question regulated selling arrangements, and when that appeared to be the
case the case was in fact solved. Then Keck was applied and the rule was found
to fall outside the scope of Article 28. This case showed therefore clearly the
difficulties which traders would meet in such cases after Keck.
6.2 Tankstation
In Tankstation41 which was also one of the first decided after
Keck, the ECJ demonstrated clearly the way it intended to deal with cases
regarding selling arrangements under Keck. The main issue there was if national
rules which provide for the compulsory closing of shops would fall inside the
Keck rule and therefore outside of the scope of Article 28. The case was
therefore in fact very similar to the Sunday trading cases.
In this case Dutch law regarding the maximum number of opening
hours and periods of compulsory closing came into consideration. There were
certain derogations from those rules, and one of those which benefited from them
were petrol stations, but with strict conditions. Under the rules petrol stations
situated at the side of motorways outside built-up areas and shops associated
with those could be open day and night, but outside lawful opening hours only
certain articles linked to journeys, such as petrol and smoking accessories, were
to be sold there. Other articles were to be kept in locked cupboards outside
lawful opening hours, and lawful opening hours were to be indicated at each
public entry to the shops. A similar derogation was provided for all other petrol
                                                
40 See discussion on this approach in chapter 7.3.
41 Joined cases C-401/1992 and C-402/1992, Tankstation ´t Heustke vof  J. B. E. Boermans
[1994] ECR I-2199, 2220.
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stations on the conditions that outside normal opening hours tobacco and smoking
accessories were to be sold only by means of vending machines.
Two shops, forming part of the petrol stations of t´Heukske and
Mr. Boermans were open to the public without the prescribed legal notice
indicating opening hours on every entrance to those shops, and furthermore,
number of articles not linked to road travel were offered for sale and had not
been placed in lockable cupboards. As that was not enough, in one of the two
shops it was also found that tobacco products were not sold by vending
machines.
The owners of the two shops were convicted at lower court and
appealed the judgment. In the appeal proceedings they claimed that the national
legislation in question was contrary to Community law. The case was therefore
referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The ECJ cited Dassonville and Keck and said that the conditions
laid down in Keck were fulfilled in this case. The rules in question related to the
times and places at which the goods in question might be sold to consumers and
applied to all relevant traders without distinguishing between the origin of the
products in question and did not affect the marketing of products from other
Member States in a manner different from how they affected domestic products.
The ECJ found therefore that Article 28 did not apply to those rules.
The national court had also asked the ECJ whether Article 82 in
conjunction with Article 3(g) and Article 10 precluded such rules which
distinguishes between different categories of traders in connection with national
provisions concerning the grant of licences for petrol stations. The ECJ found that
this was not the case. Although the ECJ had held in several cases that Articles 81
and 82 in conjunction with Article 10 required the Member States not to
introduce or maintain in force measures which might render the competition rules
for undertakings ineffective, that, according to the ECJ, did not apply in this case.
That was only the case if Member States were to require or favour the adoption
of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 81 or to
reinforce their effects, or to deprive its own rules of the character of state
legislation by delegating to private traders reasonability for taking decisions
affecting the economic sphere.
As was mentioned above this case demonstrated clearly how the
ECJ intended to deal with cases regarding selling arrangements. The approach
was very formal and strict, leaving little room for arguments by the trader. If the
rule regarded selling arrangement Keck was applied, and the rule fell almost
automatically outside the scope of Article 28.
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6.3 Semeraro casa
In Semeraro Casa42 an interesting point was brought up. The case,
which was similar to the Sunday trading cases, regarded Italian legislation on the
closure of retail outlets on Sundays. The plaintiff operated large shopping centres
which were frequently open on Sundays and public holidays, and he charged the
Italian legislation as being contrary to Article 28.
The interesting point brought up in the case was that large stores
sell a greater quantity of products imported from other Member States than that
sold by small and medium-sized businesses, and a huge amount of their sales are
on weekends. Therefore the applicants argued that the legislation in fact had
different impact on the marketing of domestic and imported goods.
The ECJ did not agree. It said that there were no evidence that the
aim of the rules at issue was to regulate trade in goods between Member States
or that, viewed as a whole, they could lead to unequal treatment between national
products and imported products as regards access to the market. Then it stated
that in this connection it had to be reiterated that national rules whose effect is to
limit the marketing of a product generally, and consequently its importation,
cannot on that ground alone be regarded as limiting access to the market for those
imported products to a greater extent than for similar national products. It then
cited Keck and said that the fact that national legislation might restrict the volume
of sales generally, and hence the volume of sales of products from other Member
States, was not sufficient to characterize such legislation as a measure having an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction.
The ECJ therefore came to the same conclusion as in Keck without
really going into this argument because, accordong to the ECJ, no evidence had
been provided for it.
This case shows well the effects of the Keck judgment on the
burden of proof in such cases. The rule regarded selling arrangements and
therefore fell under Keck. So when the trader was not able to provide concrete
evidence on that the rule in fact had effect on intra-Community trade the ECJ did
not take this into consideration and applied Keck automatically. The rule was
therefore considered to fall outside the scope of Article 28.
6.4 Vereinigte Familiapress
In the case Vereinigte Familiapress43 the question where to set
limits to the phrase “selling arrangements” in Keck came into consideration.
                                                
42 Joined cases C418-421, 460-462 & 464/93, 9-11, 14-15, 23-24 & 332/94, Semeraro Casa Uno
Srl v. Sindaco del Communae di Erbusco [1996] ECR I-2975.
43 Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungverlags-und Vertreibs GmbH v. Heinrich
Bauer Verlag [1997] 3 CMLR 1329.
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The case regarded Austrian legislation which prohibited the sale of
periodicals containing games or competitions for prizes.
An Austrian newspaper publisher brought proceedings against a
newspaper publisher established  in Germany, for an order that he should cease
to sell in Austria publications where readers were offered the chance to take part
in games for prizes in breach of the Austrian law. Since there is no such rule in
German law, the national court took the view that this rule potentially affected
intra-Community trade, and referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The ECJ began by citing Dassonville, Cassis and Keck. The
Austrian Government had claimed that the prohibition should fall outside Article
28, since the possibility of offering readers of a periodical the change to take part
in prize competitions was merely a method of promoting sales and therefore a
selling arrangement within the meaning of Keck. The ECJ came on the other hand
to the conclusion that even though the legislation in question was directed against
a method of sales promotion it was in fact about the actual content of the product
in this case, because the competitions formed in fact an integral part of the
magazine in which they appear. The ECJ found therefore that the national
legislation in question as it was applied on the fact in this case, did not fall within
the term selling arrangements in Keck. The Court said moreover that since the
legislation required traders established in other Member States to alter the
contents of their periodicals, the prohibition in fact impaired access to the market
of the Member State of importation. It therefore hindered the free movement of
goods. In principle it therefore constituted a measure having equivalent effect to a
quantative restriction within the meaning of Article 28.
The ECJ came on the other hand to the conclusion that the
legislation in question provided that the prohibition was proportionate to the
maintenance of press diversity and the objective could not be achieved by less
restrictive means. It was then left to the national court to decide if the prohibition
was proportionate.
This case demonstrated clearly the distinction which was made in
Keck, between rules regarding the characteristics of the good and selling
arrangements. In this case the rule clearly regarded the contents of the good itself
and therefore it fell outside the scope of Keck. So in this case the ECJ showed
how even Keck had its limits.
6.5 Hünermund
The cases where the ECJ has applied Keck to rules regarding
advertising are very interesting and show well how far the ECJ has stretched the
scope of the term ”selling arrangement” which was presented in Keck.
As Advocate General Jacobs stated in his opinion in Leclerc-
Siplec the role of advertising is fundamental in a developed market economy,
based on free competition, and plays a particularly important role when new
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products are launched.44 One would therefore have imagined that restrictions to
advertising would fall outside the Keck-exception from Article 28, and could only
be excepted from the Article if it could be justified by reference to mandatory
requirements. But that has not proven to be the case. This was first taken into
consideration by the ECJ in Hünermund.45
The case regarded rules which were of professional conduct and
were laid down by the body responsible for regulating the activities of pharmacists
in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Under the rules in question pharmacists were allowed to
place advertisements in newspapers and magazines under strict conditions, and
were not allowed to advertise at all in cinemas, in radio or on television. The
purpose of those rules was to prevent excessive competition between
pharmacists. Mr. Hünermund and 12 other pharmacists were unhappy with those
rules and wished to advertise para pharmaceutical products which they were
authorised to sell in their pharmacies. They therefore sought a declaration from the
competent administrative court that those rules were invalid, particularly since they
were contrary to Article 28 EC. The case was referred to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling.
The ECJ took the view that these rules fell under Keck and
therefore outside the scope of Article 28. It stated that the rules applied without
distinction as to the origin of the products in question to all pharmacists regulated
by the Professional Association and did therefore not affect the marketing of
goods from other Member States differently from that of domestic goods.
This was the first time that the ECJ stated that advertising was
covered by the phrase “national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling
arrangements” in Keck. According to Advocate General Jacobs, in his opinion in
Leclerc-Siplec, the ECJ might have been influenced by the relatively insignificant
nature of the restriction in this particular case. But in fact the harm had been done.
The conclusion of the case was that rules restricting freedom to advertise could
fall under the Keck-exception from Article 28, and therefore outside the scope of
Article 28 without further justification. Advertising was, according to the ECJ, one
of the “certain selling arrangements” in Keck.
In my opinion this was a bad ruling by the ECJ. The approach
presented by the ECJ in Keck was unclear and not easy to apply and therefore it
was very important that the ECJ would apply Keck in a sensible way from the
beginning.
One of the important aspects of post Keck-cases was how the
ECJ was going to define the phrase “certain selling arrangements” in Keck. In my
opinion it should have been defined in a narrow way since the fact is that if a rule
regards selling arrangements it is considered to fall outside the main rule in Article
                                                
44 Opinion delivered on 24 November 1994. [1995] ECR I-179.
45 Case C-292/92, Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemburg, [1993] ECR
I-6787.
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28. One way of drawing the line was to make a difference between static and
non-static selling arrangements.46 Static selling arrangements are rules relating to
the hours at which shops can be open, the length of time that people may work,
or where certain goods can be sold, but non-static selling arrangements are on the
other hand the ways which include how a manufacturer chooses to market this
specific product, for example through certain form of advertising, free offers and
the like. It seems like that could have been a good place to draw the line, and
state that selling arrangements of the latter kind would not fall under Keck,
because that they may relate much more closely to the very definition of the
product itself.
If the ECJ would have made this distinction it would have led to
that advertising would have fallen outside the scope of Keck and would always
have to be considered under Dassonville and Cassis. And in my opinion that
would have been the right approach. Advertising is extremely important when
new goods are introduced to the market, and all restrictions to it should in my
opinion therefore always fall prima facie under Article 28. But of course such
restrictions could in some circumstances be justified by a mandatory requirement
under Cassis.
But as can be seen here above the ECJ did not agree with this and
applied Keck to advertising.
Another case where this was taken into consideration was Leclerc-
Siplec.47
6.6 Leclerc-Siplec
Leclerc-Siplec distributed petrol and other fuels at service stations
in France. Those service stations were integrated into supermarkets operated
under the name E. Leclerc. Leclerc-Siplec tried to get two television companies
to advertise the petrol stations on television but was refused on ground of French
legislation that prevented the distribution sector to advertise on television. The
same provision also prohibited the advertising on television of alcoholic beverages
with an alcohol content exceeding 1,2 degrees, literary publications, the cinema
and the press. The main purpose of the prohibition was to protect France’s
regional daily press by forcing those sectors to advertise there rather than on
television.
Leclerc-Siplec started proceedings against the two television
companies and the case was referred to the ECJ.
As mentioned here above it was Advocate General Jacobs who
gave an opinion in this case. He had serious doubts about if it was right to include
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advertising in the phrase “certain selling arrangements” in Keck. He said that
advertising played a particularly important part in the launching of new products,
because it was by means of them that consumers could be persuaded to abandon
their existing brand and buy different manufacturer’s goods. Without advertising
consumers would therefore tend to continue to buy goods which they were
familiar with and it would then be much easier for established manufacturers to
retain their market share. According to Mr. Jacobs the ECJ should therefore be
extremely vigilant when it appraised the compatibility with Community law of
restrictions on advertising. He also pointed out that even if freedom to advertise
would be recognised as an essential corollary to the fundamental freedoms
created by the Treaty that would not mean that the Member State would be
prevented from regulating and restricting advertising. They could both use Article
30 exceptions and the case law on “mandatory requirements” to restrict
advertising in a reasonable manner.
But Mr. Jacobs recognised that on the grounds of Hünermund it
was very likely that the ECJ would decide that the legislation in question would
fall under Keck. Therefore he applied the test laid down in Keck and concluded
that if that approach was used the prohibition would fall outside Article 28. He
recommended on the other hand a new approach in the case in question, which in
fact led to the same conclusion.48
The ECJ yet again applied Keck without changes in this case. It
said that the prohibition in question concerned selling arrangements since it
prohibited a particular form of promotion (televised advertising) of a particular
method of marketing products (distribution). It also stated that those provisions
affected the marketing of products from other Member States and that of
domestic products in the same manner. The ECJ concluded therefore that the
rules in question were not within the scope of Article 28.
So in this case the ECJ came again to the conclusion that Keck
should be applied to advertising. But the opinion by Advocate General Jacobs in
this case is very interesting and it is difficult not to agree with him about how the
importance of advertising should mean that it should in all cases be looked at
under Dassonville and Cassis.
And in later cases the ECJ began to experience some difficulties in
applying Keck to advertising. Examples of this are De-Agostini and TV-Shop49
and Gourmet International Productions.50
                                                
48 See chapter 7.4.
49 Joined cases C-34-36/95, Konsumentobudsmannen v De Agostoni (Svenska) Förlag AB
and Konsumentombudsmannen v TV-Shop i Sverige AB.
50 Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products.
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6.7 De Agostini and TV-shop
The joined cases De Agostini and TV-shop, regarded Swedish
law which allowed the Swedish Marknadsdomstol to prohibit a trader who, in the
marketing of goods, services or other commodities, engaged in advertising or any
other activity which, by being contrary to good commercial practice or was
otherwise unfair towards consumers or other traders, from continuing so to act, or
from engage in other similar activity. That provision also applied to television
broadcasts which might be received in any country bound by the Agreement on
the European Economic Area. The Marknadsdomstol, was authorized in
particular, to order a trader to provide in his advertising information which the
Marknadsdomstol considers relevant for the consumer. It was also provided in
Swedish law that an advertisement broadcast during a commercial break on
television might not be designed to attract the attention of children under 12 years
of age.
Regarding the application of Article 28, the ECJ cited Leclerc-
Siplec and said that there the Court had held that legislation which prohibits
television advertising in a particular sector concerned selling arrangements for
products belonging to that sector in that it prohibits a particular form of promotion
of a particular method of marketing products. Then the Court cited Keck and
stated that the conditions provided for there were clearly fulfilled by its first
condition, that is, the prohibition regarded all traders operating within the national
territory. But regarding the second condition in Keck the ECJ came to an
interesting conclusion when it stated that it could not be excluded that an outright
ban of a type of promotion for a product which was lawfully sold there might have
a greater impact on products from other Member States.
The ECJ said therefore that although the efficacy of the various
types of promotion is a question of fact to be determined in principle by the
referring court, it had to be noted that De Agostini had stated that television
advertising was the only effective form of promotion enabling it to penetrate the
Swedish market since it had no other advertising methods for reaching children
and their parents. But then the ECJ stated that an outright ban on advertising
aimed at children less than 12 years of age and of misleading advertising, as
provided for by the Swedish legislation, was not covered by Article 28 of the
Treaty, unless it was shown that the ban did not affect in the same way, in fact
and in law, the marketing of national products and of products from other
Member States.
The difficult question in this case was clearly if the prohibition in
question operated equally in fact. And althoug it was left to the national court to
decide the ECJ stated that in some circumstances the only practible way to break
into a new market would be through such advertising.
Although the ECJ confirmed that adverising falls in principle under
Keck and therefore out of the scope of Article 28 it recognised that in many
circumstanses it would not fulfill the condition of in fact affecting in the same way
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the marketing of national products and of products from other Member States.
So the ECJ clearly recognised in this case the importance of advertising, which
Advocate General Jacobs had stated in Leclerc-Siplec, and it seems likely that
restrictions on advertising will not often fall outside the scope of Article 28, but
rather that they have to be justified under the Cassis doctrine or Article 30.
Another case which supports this opinion is another Swedish case,
Gourmet International Products.51
6.8 Gourmet International Products
This case regarded Swedish legislation which laid down several
restrictions on advertising spirits, wines and strong beers.
Gourmet International Products (GIP) published a magazine
entitled “Gourmet”. One issue of the magazine contained three pages of
advertisements for alcohol beverages. Because of this the Consumer Ombudsman
applied a case to the Stockholm’s Tingsrätt. The national court referred the case
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
GIP contended that an outright prohibition such as that at issue in
the main proceedings did not satisfy the criteria in Keck, since it was liable to
have a greater effect on imported goods than on those produced in the Member
State concerned. The Commission supported this view.
The Advocat General in this case was Mr. Jacobs. He yet again
made clear that in his opinion advertising were always caught by the Dassonville-
formula, but admitted that the ECJ had in fact reached the conclusion that
advertising restrictions could fall within the category of rules on selling
arrangemets under Keck. But then Mr. Jacobs went on to point out that one of
the condition in Keck was that the rules had to be non-discriminating both in law
and in fact. According to him the rules in this case, although non-discriminatory in
law, had discriminatory effect in fact.
He pointed out that according to statistics provided by GIP
Swedish products dominated the domestic market in strong beer and also that
consumers tended to favour national beverages, so that without advertising,
products from other Member States were at a disadvantage. He also pointed out
that the Swedish Government´s representative agreed at the hearing that there
was a widespread preference for locally-produced beer.
Then the Advocate General stated that, even if it might be argued
that these were matters of fact and therefore for the national court to decide, it
seemed to him inherent in any rule which prevented producers from advertising
directly to the public that it would disproportionately affect imported products.
Therefore it would in his opinion always ”prevent their access to the market or ...
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impede access ... more than it impedes the access of domestic products.” Yet
again a clear point made by Mr. Jacobs.
The ECJ cited its judgment in De Agostini and TV-Shop and
stated again that it could not be excluded that an outright prohibition, applying in
one Member State, of a type of promotion for a product which was lawfully sold
there might have a greater impact on products from other Member States.
It said that it was apparent that a prohibition on advertising such as
that at issue in the case not only prohibited a form of marketing a product but in
reality prohibited producers and importers from directing any advertising
messages at consumers, with a few insignificant exceptions.
Then the ECJ stated that even without it being necessary to carry
out a precise analysis of the facts characteristic of the Swedish situation, which
would be for the national court to do, the Court was able to conclude that, in the
case of products like alcoholic beverages, the consumption of which is linked to
traditional social practices and to local habits and customs, a prohibition of all
advertising directed at consumers in the form of advertisements in the press, on
the radio and on television, the direct mailing of unsolicited material or the placing
of posters on the public highway was liable to impede access to the market by
products from other Member States more than it impeded access by domestic
products, with which consumers were instantly more familiar.
The ECJ concluded therefore that a prohibition on advertising such
as that at issue in the main proceedings had to be regarded as affecting the
marketing of products from other Member States more heavily than the marketing
of domestic products and as therefore constituting an obstacle to trade between
Member States caught by Article 28 of the Treaty.
Here the ECJ went a step further than in De-Agostini and TV-
Shop and stated that the prohibition in the case at issue was caught by Article 28.
And it seems like the reasoning in this case could be applied to many products.
And although it is only stated that this approach should be taken when outright
bans are at issue it is difficult to see that a different approach would apply where
restrictions are considerable. And if the a line is drawn when restrictions are less,
is that not really a kind of de minimis rule?52 The problem is of course where to
draw the line, and that problem is usually left to the national courts.
6.9 DIP SpA
As has been mentioned above the ECJ has constantly refused to
limit the scope of Article 28 by applying a de minimis rule to it. It has on the
other hand sometimes reached the conclusion that the effects of some rules are so
uncertain and indirect that the rules in question should be considered to fall
outside the scope of Article 28. And although this approach is not based on a
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genuine de minimis rule, it can be used for the same purposes, to keep farfetched
claims from falling within the scope of Article 28. And the question is if such an
approach could been used instead of the approach in Keck.
One of the cases where the ECJ reached such a conclusion was
DIP SpA.53 The case regarded Italian legislation which permitted the opening of
new shops in particular areas only on receipt of a licence, which were to be
issued by municipal authorities on the recommendation of local committee.
The ECJ did not apply Keck, maybe because it did not consider
that the legislation in question clearly fell under the term selling arrangements.
Instead it looked at the possible effect of the legislation and came to the
conclusion that its restrictive effect was too uncertain and indirect to be regarded
as hindering  trade between Member States.
According to this judgment, even after Keck, measures can still fall
outside the scope of Article 28, without being inside Keck, if the restrictive effects
of them are too indirect and uncertain to be held to be in breach of Article 28.
This means that alongside the application of Dassonville, Cassis and Keck it
seems to be a certain kind of “remoteness approach” to farfetched claims. And if
there is in fact such an approach which can bring farfetched claims outside the
scope of Article 28 without using Keck, is there then any need for Keck? Should
that approach not rather be developed, cleared and applied to such
circumstances?54
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7 Different solutions on how to
decide the outer boundaries of
Article 28 EC
Both before and after the ruling in Keck and Mithouard there have
been many different views on how to decide on the proper boundaries of Article
28 EC, and the judgment in Keck was in fact an answer by the ECJ to criticisms
of its earlier case law and suggestions for its reform.
Four different solutions to this problem will now be considered, the
solution of applying only Dassonville and Cassis, the solution provided in Keck,
the solution of looking primarily at if a measure hinder access to the market and
finally the solution of applying a some kind of a de minimis rule to limit the scope
of Article 28.
7.1 The pre-Keck solution.
For many years the ECJ only applied Dassonville and Cassis to
decide if indistinctly measures brought by Member States were to be considered
as being caught by Article 28.
Under the Cassis-test, indistinctly applicable measures, though
within the Dassonville formula, will not breach Article 28 if they are necessary to
satisfy mandatory requirements. This came to be known as “the rule of reason”.
Also established in Cassis was the principle of “mutual recognition”, that is that
there was no valid reason why goods which had been put on the market lawfully
in one Member State should not be introduced into the market of other Member
States.
The rule of reason was based on the earlier hint given in
Dassonville  that in the absence of Community measures on an issue trade rules
could be accepted in certain circumstances. What it did was that it went further,
made it clear that Dassonville could be applied to indistinctly applicable
measures, and introduced how such rules could be excepted from Article 28.
One interesting point in the Cassis-test is that the ECJ took the
view that the mandatory requirements should be considered within Article 28, but
not Article 30 where derogations from the Article are provided for. This solution
has been criticised by some commentators which say that it would both be
simpler and more logical to treat the mandatory requirements as additions to the
justifications in Article 30.55 One rationale which can be given for keeping the
mandatory requirements inside Article 28 is that the Cassis exceptions may only
be used on rules which are not discriminatory. In other words, only indistinctly
applicable measures can take advantage of the mandatory requirements. Another
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reason is that the Cassis rule inhibits matters such as the protection of consumers
and the fairness of commercial transactions, which are not mentioned within
Article 30. It is therefore very difficult to say that these justification could be
covered by Article 30. The list in Article 30 is exhaustive, but under the rule of
reason the ECJ has been able to add more justification which are reasonable.
But why are more justifications for restrictions on trade allowed
under Article 28, and the rule of reason, than under Article 30? As mentioned
here above Article 30 allows discriminatory rules to be justified while the
mandatory requirements only can be used in respect of indistinctly applicable
rules. Discriminatory rules strike at the heart of the Community and are therefore
viewed with a much more suspicion than indistinctly applicable measures. The list
in Article 30 is therefore exhaustive.
It is clear that the ECJ´s conclusion in Cassis to apply Article 28 to
indistinctly applicable measures was not at all obvious. And if it is to be applied to
such measures it is clear that the door to bring in justifications for such measures
have to be open. Exceptions have to be allowed in a rather broad way and the list
has to be open because it is obviously not possible to foresee all circumstances
where the rule of reason should be applied. And the ECJ has introduced many
mandatory requirements in its judgments. Those are for example consumer
protection56, fairness of commercial transactions57, public health58 and
environmental protection59.
The rationale for the mandatory requirements has been considered
to be that many rules which regulate trade in some way are also capable of
restricting trade, but some of them may on the other hand serve objectively
justifiable purposes and it would therefore be inappropriate to render all such
rules illegal per se.60
But the application of the “rule of reason” was not without
problems. This was not at least because of the Court’s tendency to apply the
Dassonville-formula mechanically, requiring measures which might affect the
volume of overall trade, but with little potential to hinder import to be justified by
the rule of reason. The fact is that the term “indistinctly applicable” is not only
capable of applying to rules which are non-discriminatory on their face in law, but
discriminatory in effect, but also rules which are in fact both non-discriminatory in
law and effect. It would have been possible to draw the line between dual- and
equal-burden rules, but as was discussed above the ECJ chose not to do so, as
became clear in Cinéthéque.61 The approach taken by the ECJ was therefore
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very wide. Smallest restrictions, which had in fact very little and in fact only
indirect and potential affect on trade, were held to fall under the Dassonville
formula and could only be justified by mandatory requirements or Article 30.62
This very wide approach by the ECJ led defence lawyers to try to
use “Euro-defence” with exploitation of Article 28 in increasing manner. This led
the ECJ to create more and more kind of mandatory requirements which could
justify the legislations in question. Because of this the ECJ got increasing criticism
for its approach, and different commentators suggested different approaches.
Many of them regreted the disappearance of any simple general rule which would
allow for national measures to withstand challenge under Article 28, without going
through the Dassonville-formula and the Cassis test.63 The criticism was mainly
based on two things; a desire to limit the number of cases to be judged under
Article 28, and a need to increase predictability of the application of Article 28.
But it was far from being easy to make the right choice. It was
recognised that a full test, which would take all relevant factors into account,
would have the disadvantage of being difficult to apply, which would lead to high
administrative costs on the courts and the parties involved. A simplified test would
on the other hand more possibly lead to errors, since it would not take into
account all relevant factors.64
But was this approach really so bad? It is true that the rule of
reason was not very clear. Article 28 was almost without limits but some rules
could be excepted from its scope if they could be justified by mandatory
requirements. But was it not enough that the ECJ made its position on this issue
clear as in the latest Sunday trading cases? In my opinion that could have been
enough. Alongside this approach the ECJ then could have developed further the
approach used in Peralta and DIP SpA to keep farfetched claims from falling
within the scope of Article 28.65 That could have been a workable approach to
this problem. And it is interesting  that although the ECJ got heavy criticism for its
approach, its final decisions in the cases in question were not disputed.
But as was mentioned above the ECJ was criticised heavily for its
approach in the Sunday trading cases. E. White was one of the commentators
which gave his opinion on this issue and his idea of solution was to make a
distinction between rules regarding the charasteristics of the goods on one hand
and rules regarding the circumstances which goods might be sold on the other.66
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The criticism clearly got the attention of the ECJ. But which test
was the right one? The ECJ´s solution on the problem was introduced in the Keck
judgment.
7.2 The Keck solution
In Keck the ECJ presented a new approach to limit the scope of
Article 28. It was based on a distinction between rules which lay down
requirements to be met and rules relating to “selling arrangements”. According to
the ECJ such rules were not as to hinder, directly or indirectly actually or
potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville-
formula.
 It can be said that in judgments following Keck four categories of
measures have been considered to be covered by the concept “selling
arrangement”.67 Those categories are; restrictions on when goods may be sold68,
restrictions on where or by whom goods may be sold69, advertising restrictions70
and price controls71. And although the ECJ talked about “certain selling
arrangements” in its ruling it seems by looking at post-Keck cases that if a
measure is considered a selling arrangement it is presumed to be caught by Keck.
In Keck the ECJ established the presumption that national
measures governing “selling arrangements” would fall outside the scope of Article
28. With this presumption the burden of proof was shifted to the trader that was
claiming breach of Article 28, and he had to prove that the “selling arrangement”
at issue actually governed product characteristics or requirements, and therefore
constituting prima facie a breach of Article 28, which could only be excepted
from its effect by mandatory requirements under Cassis or the provisions in
Article 30.
One important question which arises when Keck is considered is
the notion of “selling arrangements”. It was clear from the beginning that it would
be difficult to draw the line between rules which relate to nature of the product
one hand, and selling arrangements of that product on the other. As was
mentioned before the ECJ could have drawn the line between static and non-
static selling arrangements and decided not to apply Keck in cases which only
regarded rules on the ways which include how a manufacturer chooses to market
his specific product, for example through certain form of advertising, free offers
and the like.
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But the ECJ chose not to make this distinction. That became
obvious in its later rulings regarding advertising in Hünermund, Leclerc-Siplec,
De Agostini and TV- Shop and Gourmet International Products72.
As I mentioned before I think that it would have been reasonable
for the ECJ to let such non-static selling arrangements fall outside the scope of
Keck. Keck is an exception from the main rule in Article 28, and to apply Keck
as widely as the ECJ has done is therefore in my opinion questionable. But
although Keck has been applied to widely the ECJ has nevertheless made its
limits clear in some cases. It has sometimes taken the view of characterising
certain rules which affect selling as a part of the nature of the product itself, and
therefore falling within the scope of Article 28. An example of this is the judgment
in Vereinigte Familiapress.73
But is it right to make a distinction between those different
categories of rules as the ECJ did in Keck? Advocate General Jacobs took this
question into consideration in his opinion in Leclerc-Siplec. There he stated that in
his opinion it was inappropriate to make such a rigid distinction between different
categories of rules, and to apply different tests depending on the category to
which particular rules belong. According to him the severity imposed by different
rules is merely one of degree. He also pointed out that Keck introduced a test
based on discrimination, but the creation of the single market on the other hand
required the abolition of all substantial barriers, and not just the abolition of
discriminatory measures.74
 Another issue is if Keck made any real changes.  It has in fact
been pointed out that it is questionable whether the exclusion of “selling
arrangements” from the scope of Article 28 in Keck in fact represents a change,
or whether it just accomplished a rhetorical shift. The question is if it only offered
the appearance of a rule-based approach, and simply pushed the unpredictable
balancing of interests from one formula to another, that is, from Dassonville and
Cassis to Keck.75 And if was so did this make any difference? And can it really
be said that this has in fact clarified anything?
It is not at all easy to answer those questions. But many
commentators seem nevertheless to agree that Keck did in fact clarify the
situation.76 Prior to Keck the scope of Article 28 seemed much to wide as
became clear in the Sunday Trading cases. Many approaches had been tried, so
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although Keck was imperfect it seemed better than former approaches.77 But it
has also been pointed out that the impact and importance of Keck should not be
overstated, although such a rule-based approach is better for legal certainty than
the former approach.78
In my opinion the approach which was introduced in Keck to limit
the outer boundaries of Article 28 was not a good one. The method to make a
distinction between categories of rules instead of looking primarily on the effects
of the rule went against the Dassonville-formula where the emphasis is on the
effects of the measures in question but not on the question if  a measure is
discriminating or not. Another thing is that the ECJ left many questions about the
scope of Keck itself unanswered, such as about the notion of “selling
arrangements”. And when the ECJ started to apply Keck it applied it in my
opinion to widely.79 A narrower approach would have been more appropriate
since Keck was an exception from the main rule in Article 28 and Dassonville.
7.3 Market access
Keck has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on factual
and legal equality instead of looking at market access, and it has been argued that
trading rules might in fact, although formally equal under Keck, operate so as to
inhibit market access.
Here above it was mentioned that the ECJ´s assumption in Keck
that “selling arrangements” were not “by nature such as to prevent…access to the
market” is very questionable if not entirely wrong. It was in fact pointed out by
Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in Leclerc-Siplec, that although it was
right that restrictions on circumstances in which certain or all goods might be
marketed did not normally obviously interfere with the free movement of goods,
as the legislation in Cassis did for example, it would nevertheless be wrong to say
that such a legislation never had any effect on trade between Member States.80 It
could have some although insignificant effect.
This test which is laid down in Keck is therefore in fact not based
on the question if the measures which are considered impede access of goods into
the market. The only thing that is stated there is that under the Keck-test such
rules are considered not to impede the market access without really looking into if
that is a fact. It is a rule based test with certain assumptions which are not
necessarily correct when looked at closely. And it is a strong argument which
Weatherill has brought up, that by treating rules affecting “selling arrangements” as
a special category the ECJ wrongly focuses on the form of measure instead of its
effect on trade.81 And that is in fact contrary to the very essence of Dassonville.
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If a measure controls selling arrangements that only hints that the rules does not
prevent market access. So the approach which the ECJ chose to take in Keck
was perhaps only a shorthand way for it to express its idea that some market
interventions do not hinder market access.
Tests for determining access to the market can be formal or
substantive, and the ECJ has not been entirely consistent of which approaches to
use. According to formal access test it is enough that goods are allowed into the
market, but under substantive market access test practical difficulties experienced
after entering the market are also considered.82
The ECJ has taken different approaches to the question if a
measure is hindering market access in different cases, and other approaches have
been considered by its Advocate Generals.
One way of deciding if a measure is in breach of the Treaty is to
say that any national regulation which impedes market access in any way is
contrary to the Treaty. In his opinion in Leclerc-Siplec Advocate General Jacobs
came to the conclusion that a test of discrimination was in fact inappropriate. An
obstacle to interstate trade could not, according to Mr. Jacobs, cease to exist
simply because an identical obstacle affected domestic trade.83 The ECJ did not
follow Mr. Jacobs opinion in this case, but in the Bosman84 and Alpine
Investments85 cases regarding the free movement of services and the free
movement of workers it seems to have used a similar approach.86
In Bosman the ECJ stated for example that although the rules in
question did not differ between domestic and foreign workers they still directly
affected players´ access to the employment market in other Member States and
were therefore capable of hindering the free movement of workers. In Alpine
Investments the ECJ stated also that even though the rules in question were non-
discriminatory they directly affected access to the markets in services in the other
Member States and could therefore be hindering intra-Community trade in
services.87
Another approach to decide if a hindrance to market access falls
inside or outside the scope of Article 28 is to assume that where there has been
indirect or direct discrimination there has been a hindrance of market access
which has to be justified. This is in fact the approach which was used in most
cases decided before Keck. Measures which fall inside the Dassonville formula
fall inside the scope of Article 28, and can only be justified by mandatory
requirements or Article 30. So the presumption is that the national measure
constitutes a barrier to market access.
                                                
82 Barnard and Deakin, page15.
83 The Advocate General is therefore obviously against both the approch in Keck and an
approach based on distinction between equal and dual burden rules, which are both based
on a discrimination-test
84 Case C-415/93 Bosman v ASBL [1995] ECR I-4921.
85 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financien [1995] ECR I-1141.
86 Bernard and Deakin, page 16.
87 See futher discussion on those two cases in chapter 8.
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A third approach which the ECJ has taken has been demonstrated
in some cases regarding discriminatory selling arrangements, where it has
presumed that there is no hindrance to market access unless discrimination can
been shown.88 An example of this is De-Agostini and TV-Shop, where the ECJ
said that it could not be excluded that an outright ban applying in one Member
State of a type of promotion for a product which was lawfully sold there might
have greater impact on products from other Member States. A similar approach
was taken in Gourmet International Products where the ECJ went step further
and stated that the ban in question was liable to impede access of foreign
products more than domestic ones, which consumers were more familiar with.
But the approach in these cases was nevertheless that in the case of rules
regarding selling arrangements the first presumption was that there was no
hindrance of access to the market and the legislation could stand, but this
presumption could be rebutted by producing statistical or other kind of evidence.
So the presumption which could be drawn from this judgment is that in the case of
measures having equal burden in law and in fact, and which do not hinder market
access the measures fall outside the scope of Article 28, while other non-
discriminatory measures and discriminatory measures fall within the scope of the
Article.
The ECJ has in some cases also applied a very  weak form of
market access test. One example of this is the ruling in Keck, where the Court
stated that non-discriminatory restrictions on “certain selling arrangements” would
fall outside the scope of Article 28 if the conditions laid down in the judgment
were fulfilled. Regarding market access the ECJ stated that such measures “were
not by nature as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any
more than it impedes access of domestic products”. As has been said here above
this presumption does not survive close scrutiny, even though the Court has
applied it in later cases. It is a very formal test. Selling arrangements are singled
out as a special category although some selling arrangements, such as a total ban
on selling certain goods or simply just a prohibition to advertise certain goods,
clearly impedes access to the market.
The ECJ could embrace a test based primarily on market access,
but it would cause some problems. It is a difficult test to apply for the ECJ, and
even more difficult for national courts, and would probably cause huge
administrative costs. It is therefore not likely that the ECJ will start using an
approach based primarily on market access to decide if measures fall under
Article 28 or not.
7.4 De minimis rule
The problem regarding deciding on the outer limits of Article 28
EC can be traced to the fact that a de minimis rule is not used in the application
                                                
88 Bernard and Deakin, page 20.
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of Article 28, and the ECJ has in fact consistently refused to introduce a de
minimis rule into cases regarding the four freedoms. An example of a case where
the question arose was the Bluhme case89. There a man was charged for
infringing a ban on keeping other kind of bees than was allowed to keep on the
tiny Danish island Læsö. The purpose of the ban was to protect a particular type
of bee from extinction on these islands. It was argued that because of the limited
geographical scope this ban should not fall within Article 28. The ECJ did not
bother to comment on this de minimis point, and ruled that the measure fell under
Article 28. 90
But the fact is that zero tolerance to restrictions of any kind was not
considered to be a good choice. That was the practice before Keck and was
regarded widely as a failure. Therefore many commentators believe that a legal
fiction of some kind is necessary to avoid the pre-Keck situation.
A very interesting theory on this point was laid down by Advocate
General Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec91. One point which he raised in his well formed
opinion was that a de minimis rule should be considered in cases regarding the
outer limits of Article 28.92 He stated that if the Keck rule was to be applied to
the rules in question it would become clear that they in fact applied to all affected
traders operating within the national territory and affected in the same manner in
law and in fact the marketing of domestic and foreign goods. So if the Keck-rule
was to be applied the rules would fall outside the scope of Article 28.
Although Jacobs did in fact agree with the conclusion he stated in
his opinion that he thought that the Courts reasoning was unsatisfactory for two
reasons. Firstly he stated that he thought it was inappropriate to make a rigid
distinction between different categories of rules and apply different tests to rules
according to those categories, because the severity of restrictions imposed by
different rules should merely be one of degree. He pointed out that this was
especially clear in the field of advertising. While the type of restrictions which
were at issue in Hünermund might have little impact on trade between Member
States that would clearly not be the case when a total ban on advertising a
particular product would be the issue.
Secondly Mr. Jacobs pointed out that the approach to exclude
measures which affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of
domestic and foreign goods, from the scope of Article 28, amounted to a
discriminatory test in relation to selling arrangements. He thought that it was
inappropriate since the central concern of the Treaty provisions on the free
movement of goods was to prevent unjustified obstacles of trade between
                                                
89 Case C-67/97 Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033.
90 Another  clear and early example of this was in case 177/82, van de Haar[1984) ECR 1797.
91 The facts of the case are laid down in chapter 6.6.
92 Steiner & Woods (page 166-168) agree with Mr. Jacobs on this point. According to them
an approach focusing of whether a measure impedes access to a national market, subject to
a de minimis rule would be a more workable rule than Keck. In their opinion it can be argued
that the market is now sufficiently established for the ECJ to permit rules which only have
minimal effects on import.
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Member States. According to Mr. Jacobs this was a strange approach since an
obstacle to intra-Community trade could not cease to exist simply because an
identical obstacle affected domestic trade. He said that he had difficulties in
accepting that Member States might arbitrarily restrict marketing of goods from
other Member States if they only imposed similar restrictions on domestic goods.
According to him the application of a discriminatory test would lead to the
fragmentation of the Community market.
According to Mr. Jacobs there was one guiding principle which
seemed to provide the appropriate test. That principle was that all undertakings
which engaged in a legitimate economic activity in a Member State should have
unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, unless there was a valid
reason for denying them this full access. This principles was according to Jacobs
to be found in all the cases regarding Article 28. Then Mr Jacobs went on and
stated that if all undertakings should in fact have unfettered access to the whole of
the Community market the appropriate test would be to find out whether there
was a substantial restriction of that access. And, as he stated, that would in fact
amount to introducing a de minimis rule in Article 28.
Mr. Jacobs stated also that even though the ECJ had rejected a de
minimis test in cases regarding the free movement of goods, for example in van
de Haar, it had really done so purely in the abstract.
But in this case the ECJ rejected this decision by Mr. Jacobs and
applied the Keck-rule in the case.
But the Court has in some cases given decisions which can be
considered to be based on a kind of a de minimis rule. Examples of this are
Peralta93 and DIP SpA94 where the ECJ stated that the measure in question fell
outside Article 28, since they were indistinctly applicable and the possibility of
that they would have any effects import was too “uncertain and indirect”.95
But what does the ECJ really mean with this? Is it saying that the
measure in question does not impose restrictions within the Dassonville formula
or are they saying that this test of remoteness is a separate principle on rules
which qualify the Dassonville formula but fall outside Article 28 because their
effect on intra-Community trade are “uncertain and indirect”? The latter would
certainly have to considered to be a kind of a de minimis rule.
It has also been pointed out that Keck itself could be considered to
be based on a certain kind of a de minimis rule. There the ECJ stated that non-
discriminatory measures relating to “selling arrangements” were not “by nature
such as to prevent…access to the market.” It has been pointed out that this is a
legal fiction and in fact a de minimis rule, since it involves that there will be certain
                                                
93 Case 379/92 [1994] ECR I 3453.
94 See chapter 6.9.
95 Another example of this is case within the free movement of sevicres, Case 266/96,
Corsica Ferries SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatory del porto di Genova, para 31.
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tolerance of measures which in fact restrict imports in some way.96 The difference
is though that the approach by the ECJ in Keck is rule-based, and not as a
genuine de minimis-rule, based on complex economic data, and also that the
approach in Keck would rarely lead to that restrictions would be tolerated which
might have harsh effects on group of traders just because the group was small.
On the other hand there are some arguments that go against that a
de minimis rule should be applied within the field of free movements of goods. It
has for example been argued that if the four freedoms are to be taken seriously as
fundamental principles of Community law, there is no room for a de minimis
rule.97 A small trader would for example not be comforted much by knowing that
a rule affecting his access to the market was not illegal because it in fact affected
so few.
Another argument against a de minimis rule in the field of free
movement of goods is that there would probably be considerable practical
problems in applying such a rule.98 And it has also been pointed out that the legal
uncertainty introduced by such a rule could in fact make it harder for national
courts to apply Article 28.
In my opinion it is almost impossible to apply Article 28 without a
some kind of a de minimis rule, or at least an approach which brings farfetched
claims outside the scope of Article 28. And the ECJ has in some cases, such as
Peralta and DIP SpA, used an approach which limits the scope of Article 28 to
rules which do not have only “uncertain and indirect” effect on intra-Community
trade. And this approach could in my opinion be developed and used on more
occasions where claims are very farfetched and the effects of the rules clearly are
both uncertain and indirect. And it can be difficult to draw the line between such
an approach and a genuine de minimis rule.
Of course it would be clearer to introduce a formal de minimis rule
in the application of Article 28, but as was stated here above the ECJ has
constantly refused to apply a de minimis rule in the fields of free movement of
goods. Instead it has chosen to apply Keck to limit the scope of Article 28. It is
therefore not likely that it will do that in the future. The Keck approach seems to
be here to stay.
                                                
96 Oliver, page 798.
97 Oliver, page 790.
98 Oliver, page 792
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8 The Keck rule in other free
movement fields
The development of case law in other free movement fields has
been similar to the development of case law in the field of free movement of
goods, to a large extent. The derogations to them in the legislation is similar, and
alongside them the ECJ has provided a justificatory test similar to the Cassis-test
for workers, services and establishment alike.99
As has been discussed here above the ECJ introduced a new
approach in Keck, providing that not all non-discriminatory measures had to be
justified under the Cassis-test. But what about the other fields of free movements?
Does Keck apply there?
8.1 Keck and the free movement of services
8.1.1 Alpine Investments
In Alpine Investment100 which regarded the free movement of
services the ECJ took into consideration if Keck should be applied. The case
regarded a firm with the same name which was established in the Netherlands.
The firm provided financial services and specialized in commodities futures trading
and acted as an “introducing broker”. It received orders from clients relating to
transactions in the market and passed them on for execution to brokers dealing
with those markets.
After the firm had been in the market for a while the Minister of
Finance in the Netherlands started to receive complaints from several investors
which complained about the selling technique which the firm used, called “cold
calling”. That technique consisted of contacting individuals by telephone without
their prior written consent. After receiving those complaints the Minister decided
to impose a general ban on the use of cold calling with the aim to protect
consumers and to save the good reputation of Dutch financial services.
Alpine Investment contested this measure and claimed that it was
contrary to Article 49 since it reduced the firms capacity of getting in contact with
potential consumers established in other Member States. When its administrative
claim was rejected the firm appealed to national court which referred questions to
the ECJ. Two parties, UK and Greek, submitted written observations in addition
to the parties. The main argument put forward by the Dutch and UK governments
was that the Keck case-law should be transposed to the field of services.
                                                
99 See for example case 33/74, Van Binsenberg v Bestuur van de Bedrifsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299.
100 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investment [1995] ECR I-1141.
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Advocate General Jacobs, which has been cited repeatedly in this
thesis, gave opinion in this case. He began by looking at Community legislation
which could be relevant to cold calling and came to the conclusion that
Community legislation neither prohibited it nor prevented Member States from
prohibiting it. He then looked at if there was a cross-border element in this case,
and came to the conclusion that it was since the provider and the recipient of the
services were established in different Member States.
Regarding the fact that the one which made the restrictions was in
fact the home country of the firm the Advocate General stated that it did not
matter if the rules were made by the importing or exporting state, if they
substantially impeded the exercise of the freedom to provide services and
adversely affected the establishment and functioning of the internal market. He
therefore held that the contested measure fell within the scope of the Treaty.
Regarding the question if the measure qualified as a restriction
within the terms of Article 49 EC, Mr. Jacobs introduced a functional criterion,
similar to the one he had introduced in Leclerc-Siplec.101 He stated that this
should be determined by a reference to a functional criterion, that is, if the
measure substantially impeded the ability of persons established in the territory to
provide intra-Community trade. As was discussed earlier in this paper, Mr.
Jacobs proposed a de minimis test in Leclerc-Siplec as an alternative to Keck.
There the ECJ chose not to follow his opinion.
On the facts of the case the Advocate General found that Article
49 had been infringed. He on the other hand came to the conclusion that the
restrictions could be justified by protection of consumers and the safeguard of the
reputation of the Netherlands securities market. He also found that the restrictions
were proportionate to the aim pursued.
The Advocate General therefore concluded that Article 49 was not
applicable to the prohibition in question.
The ECJ reached the same conclusion as the Advocate General.
As was mentioned above the Dutch and the UK governments put
forward the argument that Keck should be applied in this case, since the measure
in question concerned selling modalities, applied without discrimination and did
not have as its object or effect to favour the national market for services over
other Member States´ markets. The two governments held therefore that the
prohibition should fall outside the scope of Article 49.
The ECJ took this under consideration, but did not agree with the
two governments on this point. But commentators have reached different
conclusions about how to understand its conclusion on this point.
On this point the ECJ began by stating that the prohibition in
question was not analogous to the legislation concerning selling arrangements
                                                
101 The facts of the case are laid down in chapter 6.6. and a discussion on this approach
suggested by Mr. Jacobs is in chapter 7.4.
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which were held to fall outside the scope of Article 28 in Keck.102 It then
described the judgment in Keck and why it had been decided as it was, that is
because provisions as the one in question there were not as to prevent access to
the market of the Member State of importation or to impede access more than it
impeded access by domestic products. Then the ECJ went on to state that the
prohibition in the case at issue was imposed by the Member State in which the
provider of services was established and effected not only offers made by him to
addressees who were established in that State or moved there in order to receive
services but also offers made to potential recipients in another Member State.
Therefore the ECJ held that it did directly affect access to the market in services
in other Member States and was therefore capable of hindering intra-Community
trade in services.
One possible interpretation on this case, which has been suggested
by Friedbacher103, is that Keck was decided as it was because the ECJ saw it as
lacking any cross-border effect. Therefore ECJ made a distinction when reaching
its decision in Alpine Investments on the grounds that in that case the measures
directly affected access to the market.104
In his article on Alpine Investment105, Hatzopoulos took into
consideration another three different interpretations of the judgment on this issue.
The first possible interpretation is that the ECJ in fact only
distinguished Keck from the facts in this case. The Member State in question not
only required compliance with the rules on marketing in its own territory but also
in the territory of other Member States. So the Netherlands were in fact exporting
their restrictions on the manner in which services were to be provided. Maybe the
ECJ only ruled that this practice could not fall within Keck.
Another possible interpretation of this judgment is to say that the
ECJ was trying to limit the scope of Keck, and it said in fact that although the
conditions from Keck  were fulfilled a measure could non the less constitute a
restriction on the freedom to provide services.106 This seems to point out that
even when the Keck conditions are satisfied a measure might be considered to be
a restriction under Article 49.
The third possible interpretation is to say that the ECJ in fact
ignored Keck in this case. It ruled there immediately that the measure in question
did not constitute a restriction under Article 49, and then, almost incidentally
distinguished Keck as a final argument brought by the Netherlands and UK. So if
it had not been for the two parties the ECJ had probably forgotten all about Keck
when considering this case.
                                                
102 Para 36 of the judgment.
103 See Friedbacher, page 231.
104 Para 38 of the judgment.
105 Hatzopoulos, V., Case C-384/93, Alpine Investment BV v. Minister von Financiën,
Judgment of 10 May 1995, nyr, CMLRev 32: 1427, 1995.
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But in another article, Hatzopoulos puts forward one more and
very interesting possible explanation.107 According to it the distinction between
selling arrangements and other measures in Keck is inappropriate for ensuring the
free provision of services. According to the author this is so because services are
by essence immaterial and therefore the nature and quality of a service does not
rely on its characteristics or ingredients, but on the other hand depends on the
conditions under which it is delivered. He therefore points out that in most cases
the “selling arrangement” of a service really is a part of the service itself and can
therefore not be treated separately. An example of this was in Alpine
Investments itself, where the “cold calling” was closely linked to the service. It
was enough that the recipients of the “cold calling “ accepted the offer to create
the service relationship. He therefore believes that the distinction introduced in
Keck between selling arrangements and other measures may only be operational
in the field of free movement of goods.
This is a very interesting point, which I have to agree with. It is true
that even if a similar distinction as was made in Keck can also be made in the field
of services, the “selling arrangements” in that field are linked much more closely to
the services than the “selling arrangements” in the field of goods to the goods
themselves. Rules regarding how, when and where the service can be provided
regard the service provider himself and often an important part of the service
itself. And as was mentioned here above the rules regarding the promotion of a
service affect more directly its access to the market than such rules in the field of
goods. There is therefore an important distinction which can be made there.
But on the other hand the ECJ´s position on this issue is not yet
clear, and I believe that the importance of Alpine Investments regarding the
position of Keck in the field of services should not be overstated. The case is
limited by its facts. It is exceptional that the Member States in question was in fact
exporting its legislation on selling techniques outside its own territory. But it is
interesting that the ECJ did not use this opportunity to clarify if Keck can apply in
the field of free movement of services. It is also interesting that the ECJ put the
hindrance to access to the market forward as the most important issue, as was
discussed here above.108
So I think that before one comes to a conclusion regarding if and
then how Keck applies in the field of services, more cases on the issue have to be
decided by the ECJ. In my opinion Keck should not apply there, for the reasons
stated above, but the ECJ´s position is not clear yet. But in my opinion it is likely
that the ECJ will make this distinction.
                                                
107 Hatzopolous, Recent development of the case law of the ECJ in the field of services,
page 67 – 68.
108 See chapter 7.3.
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8.2 Keck and the free movement of workers
8.2.1 Bosman
Bosman109 regarded the transfer system that national and
transnational football associations had developed. According to the system a
football club which wanted to engage a player which had finished his contract with
another club had to pay a sum of money to the latter club. The amounts in
question were substantial.
In this case a Belgian player, Bosman, which had been employed
by a Belgian club, was hindered from securing employment for a French club by
these rules. This case came to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
What was special in this case was that the rules in question applied
equally to players moving from one club to another within a Member States as to
players moving between Member States, and the nationality of the player did not
matter.
The football associations relied on Keck to justify this system but
the ECJ did not agree with them. Instead it reached similar decision as in Alpine
Investment and stated that those rules still directly affected players access to the
employment market in other Member States and were therefore capable of
impeding freedom of movement for workers. Therefore these rules could not,
according to the ECJ, been considered to fall outside the scope of Article 39.
The judgment in this case was very similar to the one in  Alpine
Investments and most of the things said about the ECJ´s conclusion in that case
applies to Bosman to. And the ECJ in fact cited Alpine Investment when
reaching the conclusion in Bosman.
What was specially interesting in Bosman was that the ECJ ignored
a test based on if the rules applied unequally in law or in fact, depending on the
origin or the destination of the player. Instead it used a market access-test and
stated that because the rules directly affected the players´ access to the
employment market in other Member States they were capable of impeding the
freedom of movement for workers.110
In Graf the ECJ got the opportunity to define the scope of the
Bosman ruling.
                                                
109 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v.
Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.
110 This is different  from the approach in Keck  where the importance of securing direct
market access was not the primary concern although the term was mentioned there.
According to it it was assumed that when ruled fulfilled its criteria they were not as to
prevent access to the market. But as has been mentioned this assumption does not survive
close scrutiny becasue rules which regard ”certain selling arrangements” can in some
circumstances prevent market access.
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8.2.2 Graf
Graf 111 regarded the question if Article 39 EC would preclude
national legislation which denies entitlement to compensation on termination of
employment in the case of a worker who terminates his contract of employment
himself in order to take up employment with a new employer established in that
Member State or in another Member State, but grants it in the case of a worker
whose contract ends without the termination being at his own initiative or
attributable to him.
The plaintiff, Mr. Graf, was a German national, employed in
Austria. He left his job to take another one in Germany and sought to get
payments of two months salary, but was refused on the grounds that he had left
his job voluntarily before the end of the contract. Mr. Graf took this argument to
national court and argued that the limitation to the right to compensation
prinsipally affected migrant workers who voluntarily gave up their existing
employment in order to move to another Member State, and thereby gave rise to
an indirect discrimination.
The national court found that this rule did not discriminate on
grounds of nationality and did not impose any impediment on the movement of
persons across borders which was more severe than a restriction on internal
mobility. The court found that the loss of compensation was not enough to count
as a perceptible non-discriminatory restriction on mobility. The court then found
that it was not comparible with the transfer fee in Bosman which was fixed at so
high level that no employer would pay it. It would rather be a factor in the overall
assessment of the balance of financial advantage of changing employment.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the ECJ had not required in
Bosman that restrictions were perceptible to be caught by Article 39. The case
was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The Advocate General in this case was Mr. Fennelly. He took into
special consideration if the more developed case-law in the field of free
movement of goods, including the Keck judgment, could give a useful guidance in
this case. He recognised that analogies between the two fields would rarely be
perfect, mainly because of the rigid and formalistic distinctions in Keck between
product rules and certain selling arrangements. But according to the Advocate
General this distinction was less important than the motivation which led to the
adoption of it, which according to him was to identify circumstances in which
different types of rules have the same undesired effect, that is, to affect access to
the market. He said, after going through the problem with the wide case law
before Keck, that it had been reasonable for the ECJ to respond by developing
presumptions in the light of its knowledge of market behaviour, regarding the
likely effects of different types of regulation on the achievement of the ultimate
goal of Article 28. But then the Advocate General went on to state that such
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presumption should not be conclusive. According to him the validity of such
presumption had to be tested against the underlying criterion of market access in
concrete cases, rather than automatically being taken as being sufficient in itself to
dispose the case. So the Advocate General obviously did not agree with the
ECJ´s presumption in Keck that national provisions regarding selling arrangements
would not affect importers access to the market. But, according to him, it was not
necessary in this case to examine the reliability of this presumption. Then the
Advocate General cited De Agostini, Advocate General Jacobs suggestion in
Leclerc-Siplec and specially Alpine Investment, where the ECJ held that Keck
could not be applied, because the restriction in question directly affected access
to the market in services.
The Advocate General took into special consideration the general
test which had been laid down in Bosman. According to it all provisions which
preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin
to exercise his right to freedom of movement constituted an obstacle to that
freedom, even if they applied without regard to the nationality of the workers
concerned. The question was really where the limits of this test laid. The
Advocate General concluded that access in this case was not affected by the
small size of the money involved. It was, in his view too tenuous, remote and
uncertain to constitute a restriction on free movement. His opinion was therefore
in line with the cases in the field of free movements of goods, where it is unclear if
the ECJ is in fact using a certain kind of a de minimis rule.112
The ECJ agreed with the Advocate General and stated in its
judgment that the events leading to compensation were to uncertain and indirect a
possibility for legislation to be capable of being regarded as liable to hinder
freedom of movement for workers.113
The opinion by Advocate General Fennelly in this case is very
interesting. It is very similar to Hatzopolous´s idea114 about how the distinction
which was made in Keck can not been applied in other fields than free movement
of goods. And it is obvious that the Advocate General is also in favor of market
access test to limit the scope of Article 28.
                                                
112 Such as Peralta and DIP Spa.  See chapters 7.4. and 9.
113 This is similar to the ”remoteness approach” of the ECJ in Peralta, DIP SpA  and case C-
69/88 Krantz which all regarded Article 28. In this case the ECJ in fact cited Kranz, where it
was stated that ”.. the possibility that nationals of other Member States would hesitate to
sell goods on instalment terms to purchasers in the Member State concerned because such
goods would be liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the purchasers failed to
discharge their Netherlands tax debts is too uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion
that a national provision authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member
State”. This ”rule of remoteness” is discussed further in chapters 7.4. and 9.
114 See chapter 8.1.
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8.2.3 Lehtonen
Lehtonen115 was decided shortly after Graf, in april 2000.
Although it regarded transfer rules for basketball players in Belgium it was quite
different from Bosman. The Bosman case concerned the transfer fees which a
club had to pay if it wished to engage a player from another club after the player's
contract with that club had expired, and also the rules on foreigners under which
football clubs could play only a limited number of foreign professionals, but this
case concerned provisions which imposed time-limits on transfers of players
between clubs if the player concerned was to play for the new club during the
current season.
The opinion was put forward that the application of Article 39 on
the free movement of workers should be restricted in accordance with the Keck
judgment. A distinction should therefore be drawn between rules for the exercise
of a profession and restrictions on access, and Article 39 should only apply to
restrictions on access.
Advocate General Alber gave his opinion in this case, and took
into consideration if there should be an application by analogy of Keck.
According to him there was no reason in this case to do that, as the ECJ had in
fact concluded in Bosman.
Then the Advocate General made an interesting comment on if
there should be such an application in Article 39. He stated that, independently of
the case in question, there was no reason to introduce such a restriction of the
scope of Article 39 of the EC Treaty. The ECJ had limited the wide scope of
Article 28 in Keck and Mithouard, by excluding rules on selling arrangements
from its scope. According to him selling arrangements were characterised by the
fact that they do not necessarily affect those who import or export a product, but
only the subsequent sale to the final consumer and a foreign producer does
therefore not have to alter his product according to the sales market he has in
mind. Selling arrangements thus as a rule affected trade in goods only very
indirectly. If trade in goods between Member States was nevertheless affected to
a greater degree than internal trade within the Member State, then the formulation
used in Keck would no longer apply, as the very wording of the judgment
showed. Then the Advocate General stated that product-related requirements
would always come under free movement of goods, and rules on the exercise of a
profession were much closer to product-related rules than to rules on selling
arrangements. Rules on exercise had to be complied with directly by a citizen of
the Union who wished to assert the fundamental freedom under Article 48 of the
EC Treaty. He had to take account of new rules of exercise and acquire
corresponding qualifications, possibly after every cross-frontier change of
employment.
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The Advocate General recognized that the freedom of movement
for workers had a wide definition, comparable to the Dassonville formula. But
according to him it was already restricted by the fact that freedom of movement
may be relied on only in a cross-border situation, and that starting point for
reliance on freedom of movement already had in fact a similar restrictive effect to
that under Keck and Mithouard for selling arrangements.
This is a very interesting point by the Advocate General, and in line
with Advocate General Fennellys opinion in Graf and the opinion which
Hatzopoulos has presented. It is true that there is a huge difference between those
two fields, and that there is probably not a similar need for a Keck rule in the field
of workers as in the field of goods.
But in this case the ECJ reached a similar decision as in Bosman
regarding the question if there was an obstacle to the freedom of workers, and
cited that judgment. It therefore reached the decision that the restriction was
caught by Article 39 EC. The ECJ did on the other hand not mention Keck in its
judgment.
8.3 Conclusion on the application of Keck to
other fields than free movement of goods
As can be seen here above the ECJ has still not made its position
clear on the question if Keck should be applied to rules regarding other fields than
the free movement of goods, and it is interesting how it seems to have avoided to
give clear rulings on this question.
In my opinion the application of Keck should be limited to the field
of free movement of goods and I agree with Hatzopoulos, Advocate General
Fennelly and Advocate General Alber on that issue. The distinction made in Keck
between rules regarding selling arrangements and other rules does after all make
some sense in the field of goods, but the nature of the other fields is different so
even if a similar distinction can be made between rules in this field it would be
wrong to let a category of rules fall outside the relevant Treaty articles without
further justifications.
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9 Conclusion
One thing that is clear about the application of Article 28, is that it
is extremely difficult to find a rule to limit its outer boundaries in a simple and a
clear way. The main problem in its application is the wideness of the Dassonville-
formula which by its wording catches smallest restrictions, and when such a rule is
considered to catch indirectly applicable measures, as was decided in Cassis, the
limits of the outer boundaries of Article 28 almost disappear, because almost
every rule which regulates trade can in fact be said to affect intra-Community
trade in some way. It would be possible to solve the problem by applying some
kind of a de minimis rule to limit the scope of the Article, as has been done in the
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, but the ECJ has consistently
refused to apply such a rule in this field. On the other hand the ECJ has
sometimes said that because the effects of the restriction in question were too
“uncertain and indirect” the rules should fall outside the scope of Article 28. And
although this approach is not a genuine de minimis rule, it can be used for the
same purpose as such a rule, that is to get farfetched claims about rules with
unclear, uncertain and indirect effects on intra-Community trade outside the scope
of Article 28.
 After its ruling in Cassis the ECJ seemed to draw the line between
equal and dual burden rules, and although that approach is primarily based on the
question if there has been any discrimination, and not on the effects of the rule as
in Dassonville, this approach at least made the application of Article 28 easier.
But in Cinéthéque the ECJ decided to use a different approach, and applied
Article 28 to an equal burden rule, and based this opinion on the presumption that
the application of the system there might create barriers to intra-Community trade.
In this case the restriction was a complete ban on sale for a certain time, and
maybe the ECJ felt that for that reason it was difficult to let the rule fall outside the
scope of Article 28. But nevertheless this judgment clearly got the attention of
traders and defence lawyers throughout Europe. This judgment meant that rules
with little and uncertain potential effect on intra-Community trade could be tried
before the ECJ.
This had the effects that a huge amount of cases of this kind were
tried before the ECJ. In those cases the ECJ expressed its opinion that the rules in
question there could be justified under Cassis but the problem was that the
proportionality-test was left to national courts, which reached different
conclusions on this issue. This therefore caused a huge legal uncertainty in this
field. Because of this the ECJ provided clearer guidance to the national courts on
this issue in later cases, so maybe this period in the cases before the ECJ could
have passed without further actions by the ECJ.
But the ECJ obviously did not think so and was probably affected
by the discussion which took place in academic literature on the scope of Article
28. And the ECJ´s new approach to limit the scope of Article 28 was presented
in Keck.
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Keck presented a rule-based approach to Article 28. According to
it certain selling arrangements would fall outside the scope of Article 28, unless it
was proven that they were discriminatory. But as was pointed out by many, and
perhaps most clearly by Advocate General Jacobs, this approach, to make a
distinction between categories of rules, letting one category fall inside the scope of
Article 28 but the other one outside its scope was not just. The presumption in
Keck that “selling arrangements” were not “by nature such as to prevent…access
to the market” was also very questionable to say the least. It was right that
restrictions on circumstances in which certain or all goods might be marketed did
not normally obviously interfere with the free movement of goods, but
nevertheless it was clearly wrong to say that such a legislation had never effect on
trade between Member States. Although its effect would probably always be
insignificant it could in some circumstances have some effect.
The reason for the ECJ´s judgment in Keck was clearly to open a
way out of the scope of Article 28 for rules which only had uncertain and indirect
effects on intra-Community trade. It was intended to keep farfetched claims from
falling within the scope of Article 28. But this could have been done with a
different approach.
As was mentioned here above the main problem in the application
of Article 28 has been that the ECJ has constantly refused to apply a de minimis
rule to it to limit its scope. But on the other hand the ECJ has, in cases such as
Peralta and DIP SpA, stated that where the effects of a measure is too
“uncertain and  indirect” the measure should fall outside the scope of Article 28.
In my opinion the ECJ could use this approach more frequently. It
makes a lot more sense to let a rule fall outside the scope of Article 28 because of
the fact that its effects are uncertain and indirect than basing the judgment on the
fact that the rule falls inside the scope of a certain category of rules which have
such indirect and uncertain effects. By reaching the conclusion in Keck the ECJ
went in my opinion to far from the essence of Article 28, Dassonville and Cassis.
It is a fact that the effects of selling arrangements in the field of free movement of
goods are generally uncertain and indirect and therefore they could in most cases
fall outside the scope of Article 28, as the rules in Peralta and DIP SpA, without
applying Keck.
So in my opinion Keck was not a good judgment. And it was also
very unclear, for example regarding the scope of the phrase “selling
arrangements”. It was therefore very important how the ECJ decided to apply this
new approach. In my opinion the ECJ should have applied Keck in a narrow
way, making a distinction between static and non-static selling arrangements.
Then it would for example have avoided the difficulties in applying Keck to
advertising. Keck is an exception from the main rule in Article 28, and that should
mean that it should be confined narrowly.
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It has not yet been made clear by the ECJ if Keck should be
applied to other fields than free movement of goods.
In my opinion it should not. Although Keck was not the right
approach to limit the outer boundaries of Article 28, it is true that the selling
arrangements which were precluded by the application of Article 28 do not affect
intra-Community trade in most circumstances. In the other fields this distinction
can not be made between categories of rules.  And although the ECJ has not yet
concluded on this issue I believe that it will not apply Keck to other fields then
free movement of goods.
Regarding how the ECJ has chosen to limit the scope of Articles
39 and 49 EC it is interesting to take a look at on what grounds it reached its
conclusion in Graf. There it completely ignored Keck and stated that the effects
of rules in question were too uncertain and indirect for the rules to be caught by
Article 39. And as was stated here above I believe that the ECJ could use this
kind of approach on more occasions, not only in those two fields, but also within
the free movement of goods.
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